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**RETHINKING NEGOTIATION:  
FEMINIST VIEWS OF COMMUNICATION AND EXCHANGE**

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Negotiation is a ubiquitous activity involved in solving problems, allocating resources, and making decisions at work and in families. Whether parties are compromising over distributive issues in zero sum bargaining or making trades for mutual gain in integrative negotiation, the notion of exchange and trades are central to both negotiation theory and practice. Looking at negotiation from a feminist perspective, the exchange model marginalizes interpretive processes and relational aspects of negotiation. Co-construction is proposed as an alternative requiring the communicative competencies of collaboration and mutual appreciation. A case involving negotiations over a program fee is used to illustrate the different approaches.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

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One type of social interaction that has become an essential skill for all walks of life is negotiation. At one time negotiation was viewed as a sordid affair associated with haggling, bartering, and back room deal making (Kolb & Putnam, 1997). It is now a ubiquitous activity used in solving problems, sharing resources, and making decisions in multiple settings, including family and work environments. In the work setting, negotiation is often the primary form of interaction for hiring, making work assignments, deliberating on budgets, and enacting group decisions. It is not only central to labor-management relationships; it is also the mechanism for developing organizational contracts and trade agreements. In an era characterized by corporate mergers and new organizational forms (McPhee & Poole, in press), negotiation is clearly an essential and complex communication skill.

Negotiation is also a special type of social interaction, one that differs from group decision-making (Putnam & Roloff, 1992). These differences stem from the characteristics of perceived incompatibility, interdependence between parties, and simultaneous cooperative and competitive relationships. Social interactions in traditional negotiations rely on exchanges of proposals and counterproposals, making arguments for preferred outcomes, and developing strategies and tactics to obtain desired ends.

These assumptions and characteristics contribute to conceiving of bargaining as a “scripted activity” (O’Connor & Adams, 1996). That is, individuals enter a negotiation with a prototype of standard actions. These scripted activities include: making offers, defending and refuting positions, discussing issues, exchanging compromises, and reaching an agreement. In general, people share a conceptual representation that negotiation is competitive and individualistic, defined by trades or exchanges, and often results in impasse. Even young children learn this script and are skilled at taking positions and engaging in trade-offs to reach a settlement (Sheldon, 1992, Sheldon & Johnson, 1994).

Here we revise the notion of negotiation as a scripted social interaction. In particular, we adopt a feminist perspective to review and critique traditional models of negotiation by centering on “exchange” as the central element of bargaining. Through examining the way that exchange underlies the essence of negotiation, the goals and outcomes, the nature of relationships, and the processes, we set forth an alternative model—one rooted in feminist assumptions of connectedness and co-construction of the process. We contend that in traditional approaches to negotiation, relationship and connection disappear as the fundamental ways in which people see and define their situation. By focusing on trades, negotiation centers on getting to settlements rather than understanding situations. Communication within the traditional model typically serves as information exchange and the execution of bargaining tactics to foster the pursuit of a settlement.

We begin with an overview of the traditional models of negotiation and the role of exchange in these approaches. Then we present feminist critiques of exchange and position our analysis within this literature. Later we set up the rudimentary elements of an alternative model by comparing the essence, goals and outcomes, relationships, and processes of this perspective with

a prototype of the traditional models. We will use a negotiation case to exemplify these comparisons. We summarize and discuss situations in which this alternative might be used as a viable option to traditional approaches to negotiation in our conclusion.

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## II. TRADITIONAL MODELS OF NEGOTIATION

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Traditional studies in negotiation fall into the arena known as negotiation analysis. This work is based on the belief that descriptions of negotiation grounded in empirical research can assist bargainers in anticipating the other side's behaviors. Negotiation analysts provide prescriptive or normative advice based on predictions for how the other party is likely to behave (Sebenius, 1992).

This traditional research emanates from three general types of models: game theory, distributive and integrative bargaining, and principled negotiation. Game theory draws from economic principles and centers on maximizing gains, minimizing losses, assessing utilities of options, and reaching optimal outcomes. Through applying economic rationality to decision making, this approach focuses on ascertaining alternative courses of action and shaping rational choice (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Raiffa, 1982).

Distributive and integrative models of negotiation draw from and react to notions of economic rationality. Distributive negotiation, also called zero-sum bargaining, concentrates on maximizing individual payoffs in situations in which one person's gain is the other person's loss. Negotiators typically set target points for what each person wants and resistance points for each individual's bottom line. For instance, in the sale of a house, both the buyer and seller set target and resistance points. The target points refer to both bargainers' preferred prices and the resistance points are the end amounts in which parties will no longer concede. In the distributive model, bargaining becomes the process of reaching a settlement between the target and resistance points. Each party aims to capture as much of the bargaining range as possible (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985). Negotiation as a distributive process, then, is primarily a form of conflict management aimed at compromise. Successful negotiators start high, concede slowly, exaggerate the value of concessions, minimize the other party's concessions, conceal information, argue forcefully, and capture more of the bargaining zone (Lax & Sebenius, 1986).

In contrast, an integrative approach to negotiation presumes that the goals of the parties are not mutually exclusive; hence, it is possible for participants to achieve joint gains. Thus, individuals, through negotiation, find ways to combine their diverse goals into a collective effort (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985). Parties start from pre-set positions; but through sharing information and creative problem solving, they make trades based on complementary interests that increase the size of joint gains for both individuals (Pruitt, 1981, 1983).

The relationship between integrative and distributive bargaining remains unclear. In some ways the two approaches are interdependent processes of the same model and in other ways they are distinct perspectives on negotiation (Putnam, 1990). Although Walton and McKersie (1965) depict these processes as descriptive models, they have surfaced in the field as normative approaches, aimed at developing principles to guide effective negotiation (Lewicki, Weiss, & Lewin, 1992).

Principled negotiation draws from integrative bargaining and sets forth guidelines for reaching joint gain or win-win settlements. Critical of positional bargaining that typifies the distributive

process, principled negotiation urges bargainers to focus on interests, not positions; separate people from the problem; invent options for mutual gain; and use objective criteria to reach settlements (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). Popular in practice, this perspective has revamped the training of negotiators and spawned major programs on mutual gains bargaining (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1994; Cutcher-Gershenfeld, McKersie, & Walton, 1995). However, there are barriers to reaching integrative agreements, including overconfidence about obtaining desired outcomes, framing positive and negative outcomes differently, and reliance on processes rooted in splitting the pie (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). On the prescriptive level, researchers continue to offer advice based on the management of exchanges: types of opening offers and responses, strategies and tactics to use or to avoid, ways of ascertaining interests and needs, and ways to overcome barriers in reaching mutual gains agreements (Friedman, 1992; Heckscher & Hall, 1994).

Each of these perspectives embraces exchange as the essence of negotiation. Gulliver (1979) even defines bargaining as, “the presentation and exchange of specific proposals for terms of agreement on issues” (p. 71). In the distributive approach, exchanging proposals is typically viewed as the vehicle or recommended strategy for settling within the bargaining zone. Exchange begins with both parties stating their asking prices or initial offers. Opening offers set the tone for trading concessions in which the bargainers move closer to each other through exchanging incremental moves.

Exchange is also the essence of integrative and principled negotiation. In this approach, bargainers exchange information about their needs, ways of reaching a settlement, and criteria for assessing options. Exchange becomes the primary way that parties create value and discover arenas for joint gain (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). In integrative negotiation, exchange is the means through which bargainers learn and alter their perceptions about options available for joint gain (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985).

In each of these three models, exchange is the modus operandi and the very heart of negotiation (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985). It is the means through which bargainers gain competitive edge, the way the process is enacted, the basis for reaching outcomes, and the way in which bargainers learn about the options available to them (Thompson, 1998).



### III. EXCHANGE AND NEGOTIATION AS GENDERED ACTIVITIES

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Exchange, as it functions in these three perspectives, is a gendered activity. What does it mean to say that a particular practice like exchange is gendered? A practice is seen as gendered if its attributes are more commonly associated with one gender than the other; thus making dimensions linked to the other gender less valued. Parenting, for example, entails nurturance and the giving of care, practices linked to mothering. Acts of fathering, then, often remain hidden and devalued in the process. In this essay we contend that both exchange and negotiation are gendered activities through the ways that trades grow out of individualistic needs, become reduced to commodities, and emerge as instrumental activities that define the nature of outcomes.

Other feminist scholars have presented critiques of social exchange (Howard & Hollander, 1997), exchange theory (Hartsock, 1985), and utility comparisons (Ferber & Nelson, 1993; Strober, 1994). Our essay draws from these critiques but differs from them in several important ways. First, we view exchange as the essence of the negotiation process; hence, exchange occurs within and aids in defining a particular activity, bargaining. Second, our critique of exchange in negotiations is nested in social relations rather than in the marketplace as an institution (Hartsock, 1985). Moreover, unlike Hartsock, who adopts a feminist standpoint view, our critique and reframing of exchange does not grow out of an essentialist view of women's activity or the positioning of exchange as a materialistic phenomenon. By analyzing the taken-for-granted oppositions embedded in the traditional model of bargaining, we deconstruct negotiation as a gendered activity and set forth an alternative model, one rooted in co-construction rather than in exchange. Hence, we adopt a feminist poststructural stance to critique negotiation and offer an alternative model.

Negotiation, as we have previously argued, is also a gendered activity (Kolb & Putnam, 1997). It is gendered in that the qualities of effective bargainers are linked to masculinity—qualities such as individuality and independence, competition, objectivity, analytic rationality, instrumentality, reasoning from universal principles, and strategic thinking. Those attributes typically labeled as feminine are less valued—qualities such as community, subjectivity, intuition, emotionality, expressiveness, reasoning from particulars, and ad hoc thinking. Negotiation is also gendered through its emphasis on the framing of issues, the exercise of power in the legal system (Gray, 1994), and the way women lack voice and a sense of place at the bargaining table (Kolb & Coolidge, 1988). From a feminist standpoint, the experiences of women are typically excluded from negotiation theories and research. Furthermore, studies on gender and negotiation typically graft women onto the existing structure of bargaining (Gray, 1994).

This essay extends this critique by focusing on the centrality of exchange in negotiation and by setting forth an alternative model—one rooted in feminist values and assumptions about social interaction. Just as economics forms the foundation for traditional perspectives, feminist thinking guides the theoretical development of an alternative model. This alternative is not simply a minor repair to existing perspectives or a change in style inserted into the dominant

framework. Rather it represents a shift in the fundamental thinking that underlies the nature and process of negotiation.

At first blush, it may seem naïve, simple, or unnatural when compared to the traditional model. However, any option that stands in comparison to the dominant discourse will likely appear deficient, devalued, and inadequate—since the standards of traditional perspectives have shaped our very knowledge of a particular phenomenon. From a political stance, the traditional model surfaces as hegemonic. The temptation, when exposed to “difference,” is to critique it using the assumptions and criteria of the traditional approach. Thus, a reader might criticize this alternative by arguing that “negotiators won’t play by the rules or will use goals and strategies of the alternative model to exploit his or her opponent.” This criticism, however, draws from and functions within the status quo. In many ways, it serves to reinstate the dominant stance of the traditional model rather than to critique its alternative. The alternative approach presented in this essay must and should be critiqued, but it needs to be examined from a new set of criteria and questions, ones that develop from within and consist with the perspective advocated in this essay.

This essay aims to recapture many of the features deemed absent or marginalized in traditional approaches to negotiation, namely, relationship, connection, understanding, and dialogue. We present this model as an option, not as a replacement or panacea for problems with existing approaches.

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#### **IV. COMMODITY AS THE METAPHOR FOR EXCHANGE**

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Exchange, as noted previously, is the heart of negotiation. As the essence of bargaining, it not only influences the use of concessions, strategies, and tactics, but it also underlies the fundamental image of the process. The dominant metaphor in understanding exchange is commodity (Howard & Hollander, 1997). Even though bargaining centers on symbolic costs and rewards, the commodity metaphor remains dominant in traditional views of negotiation. Social processes in bargaining are converted to economic language and assigned weights and measures; thus, the value of a particular offer is given a numerical weight that complies with patriarchal assumptions of objectivity (Howard & Hollander, 1997). Treating bargaining as the distribution of resources also reinforces the commodity metaphor by presuming clear divisions between costs and benefits (Hartsock, 1985). By conceiving of an exchange as a commodity, negotiators measure their achievements from the criteria of whether they made “a good deal.” They simultaneously transfer aspects of their relationship such as emotional support, loyalty, and understanding to processes that can be exchanged, for example, “if you give me a good deal, I will be loyal to you” (Strober, 1994). The commodity metaphor, then, sets forth a language system of rewards, costs, resources, utilities, and trades that pervades the negotiation literature and is rooted in patriarchal values. This metaphor grounds interactions in material resources that shove identity and relationships into the shadow of negotiation (Kolb & Williams, 1999).

A feminist lens highlights elements of negotiation that are typically marginalized or missing from exchange-based models, such as, connectedness, collaboration, expressiveness, and equality. Figure 1 (see Annex) contrasts the traditional and the alternative models based on four dimensions: essence of the activity, the goals and outcomes of bargaining, relationship of negotiators, and negotiation process.

## V. A COMPARISON OF THE TRADITIONAL AND THE ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES

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In the traditional models, exchange and trades form the essence of the process. Both are limited through reducing the practice of bargaining to individual needs, use of a commodity metaphor, and reliance on a language system of rewards and costs. Both of them privilege patriarchal values, namely, objectivity and materialism, as ways of depicting social processes. There is nothing inherent in the particulars of a negotiation that would suggest that one model of negotiation would dominate in a given situation. However, the processes that individuals experience in the bargaining entail vastly different approaches. An example of a negotiation demonstrates how goals, relationships, and outcomes differ as we compare and contrast the traditional and the alternative models.

This negotiation centers on a fee arrangement between Strategic Information Technology Institute (SITI), a consulting firm, and Browne Associates. Karen Davenport, the Director of Programming at SITI, is in charge of the educational programs that the company offers to information technology professionals and general managers. SITI's basic three-day educational seminar—Strategic Models in Distributive Systems—has been highly successful. Based on this success, Davenport has developed an advanced seminar for professionals who have completed the basic course. Since SITI does not have the resources to run these programs, the company subcontracts the marketing operations of the course to Browne Associates, a marketing and management firm.

Several years ago, Davenport's predecessor negotiated a successful contract for marketing the basic model's course. Basically, Browne Associates incurs all the costs to advertise and manage the program, retains the revenues generated, and pays a guaranteed fixed fee to SITI for delivery of each course. The advanced course promises to be a good deal for both SITI and Browne Associates. SITI can use it to develop long-term relationships with companies and to enhance future consulting jobs. Having another course to market means additional revenue for Browne Associates.

Karen Davenport, SITI's programming director, and Sam Browne, the founder and president of Browne Associates, meet to negotiate the revenue sharing arrangement for the advanced course. Although offering the advanced seminars appeals to both parties, the negotiations do not begin on an auspicious note. As Karen describes, "We meet at our usual place for breakfast. Sam hands me his proposal. I am shocked. It is clear that the fee structure that Sam proposes is considerably less than the one that SITI receives for the basic course. SITI cannot afford to deliver the program with this loss of revenue."

The task of developing a mutually acceptable fee arrangement is the goal of the negotiation. Yet the kind of process that follows and the type of agreement reached is not predetermined. This negotiation could go in several different directions. It could follow the traditional distributive or integrative path or it could be worked out through an alternative model of co-construction. We develop these alternatives through describing how the traditional approaches differ from the alternative model in enacting the essence of the process—exchange versus co-construction.

## A. EXCHANGE VERSUS CO-CONSTRUCTION

As Figure 1 (see Annex) illustrates, the traditional views of negotiation are rooted in practices of exchange with trading, reciprocity, balance, equity, and transaction as the key characteristics. The alternative model, in contrast, is situated in co-construction with mutual inquiry promoting integration, blending proposals, facilitating equality, and producing collaboration as the central activities of bargaining. In traditional negotiation, progress toward a settlement is typically measured through frequent exchanges and use of reciprocal concessions. The term “reciprocal concessions” refers to each party responding to her opponent’s compromise with a counterproposal that concedes on issues. In bargaining, giving trades or exchanges entails altering original proposals and moving closer to the other side. As part of the unstated script of bargaining, reciprocity aims to equalize bargaining control. However, it often surfaces in actual negotiations as a strategy to promote one side’s instrumental gain. Reciprocity of moves demonstrates good faith bargaining and keeps the negotiation moving toward a settlement. Refusal to reciprocate can lead to a stalemate that slows down or even stops the negotiation process (Raiffa, 1982).

As an alternative to exchange, co-construction occurs through connecting and creating mutual understanding. In co-construction, negotiators develop joint actions from mutual inquiry rather than trades. Mutual inquiry differs from trades by centering on the recursive nature in which negotiating generates meanings or interpretations of events. Inquiry pushes parties to question commonly held definitions, to dispute the naming or labeling of issues, and to challenge the status quo through expanding and envisioning alternatives. Rather than using trades to generate joint gain, mutual inquiry encourages expansive thinking and envisioning what might be in the future. Rather than moving from counterproposals and reciprocal concessions, mutual inquiry uncovers seeds of change through joint learning. Hence, co-construction and mutual inquiry, activities that are shoved into the background in traditional models, move to the forefront in the proposed alternative view of negotiation. Concomitantly, attributes of connection and community linked to feminist thinking become central rather than marginal in the alternative model.

In the alternative model, progress or forward movement emanates from integrating negotiated issues within the larger system in which they occur. That is, negotiation interaction moves from deliberations about particulars, e.g., issues, positions, and facts, to discussions about the relational and organizational system, e.g., definitions, background, lines of authority, and coherence within the system. Integration, then, becomes a way of moving negotiation “forward,” not through stages or steps, but through situating positions and issues within the larger context of the participants. Through integration, parties can describe particular moments in which a system functions effectively and can entertain new options through appreciating the complexity and scope of the situation.

Other contrasting features of the traditional and alternative approaches are equity versus equality and balanced versus blended. The traditional models cast the act of trading as a balanced or equitable process (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Repeated exchanges of rewards and costs provide negotiators with ways “to level the playing field.” Reciprocal concessions and matching patterns such as tit for tat aim to balance resources and minimize power differences (Rubin, Pruitt, &

Kim, 1994). This notion of equity, however, roots power in individual control of resources. Negotiators who espouse this belief often fail to recognize how equivalency is different when it surfaces as equal numbers, equal ratio, divided equitably, or distributed based on contributions to the group (Howard & Hollander, 1997). Thus, the exchange process that is so fundamental to negotiation embodies a notion of justice rooted in the agential goals of equity rather than in the communal goals of equality.

The alternative model, in contrast, relies on communal goals rooted in feminist thinking. Based on intimacy, mutuality, and camaraderie, equality arises from the caliber of communication rather than from balancing power differences. It emanates from interaction that is responsive to multiple and emergent voices, allows participants a chance to speak and be heard, and legitimates discussion of new vistas and directions (Foss & Griffin, 1995). Proposals in this model are blended through open deliberations rather than balanced through the use of reciprocal trades.

Another contrasting feature between the two approaches is transaction versus collaboration. Traditional bargaining is often called transactional negotiation, referring to a buyer-seller transaction. The concept of transaction, however, implies transfers, calculated exchanges, and mutually rewarding trades. In negotiation, these transfers represent calculations based on utility functions and decisions derived from anticipating the opponent's behavior (Gray, 1994). The concept of transaction, then, reaffirms the view that negotiation is a series of strategic exchanges that can be arranged and rearranged to achieve the most beneficial combination. Communication in the traditional model also appears as a transaction, one in which information and tactical behaviors are transferred back and forth through a give and take process.

Unlike the traditional model, the alternative approach draws on a communal perspective to cast negotiation as collaboration rather than a transaction. Consistent with feminist thinking, a collaboration relies on joint experience and treats communication as a forum for ongoing and active deliberations that lead to a dialogue about diverse perspectives. Collaboration is a type of communicative competence in which participants build upon each other's positions to find opportunities for joint actions and shared experiences (Barrett, 1995).

Thus, a feminist critique and revision of the traditional model of negotiation highlights different and often marginalized elements of the process. The essence of negotiation in this alternative model is co-construction rather than exchange. Co-construction emanates from mutual inquiry, integration of ideas, equality of voice, and collaboration rather than the traditional elements of trades, reciprocity, equity, and transaction.

Let's return to the example of Karen Davenport to consider how the three different routes might function differently for the same bargaining situation.

## **B. TRADITIONAL MODEL I—DISTRIBUTIVE EXCHANGE**

In the distributive model, the negotiation occurs through exchanging a series of proposals and counter proposals. Sam claims that his costs for marketing and managing the advanced course are high and he would be taking all the risks; therefore, he deserves a greater share of the

revenues. Karen, who clearly wants this course, realizes that SITI needs Browne Associates more than it does the new course. She looks at Sam's numbers and makes a counter proposal by giving in on her initial revenue demand for SITI. Sam reinforces his position by arguing how much risk is involved and how he must cover the costs for these risks.

Karen reasons that in the early years, no one imagined that the basic course would be so successful. The costs and the risks were equally high for both parties. Sam was getting a good deal from the basic course seminars. The new course would probably have the same life cycle and Sam should continue to compromise on the proposed fee that he will have to pay SITI for the course delivery.

As the negotiation progresses, Karen argues that this program is going to be a real moneymaker for Browne Associates, just as the basic models course has been. She then proposes her bottom line—the same revenue arrangement that they currently have for the basic course. She implies that if SITI cannot get this arrangement, then the whole idea of an advanced course will be off the table. The negotiation proceeds with Karen and Sam going back and forth—Sam moaning about the costs and risks to Browne Associates and Karen claiming that Sam's company has minimal risks and has fared well from the original deal. In the end, both parties reach a compromise settlement. Sam pays a lower fee to SITI for the advanced course than he does for the basic seminar, but one that was more than he originally proposed. Both parties feel dissatisfied with the process and both agree to reopen the negotiation next year.

### **C. TRADITIONAL MODEL II—INTEGRATIVE EXCHANGE**

In the integrative model, rather than working from positions, both parties try to decipher each other's interests and make proposals to dovetail these different interests. The integrative bargaining might proceed in this fashion: After Karen recovers from her shock regarding the low fee Sam proposes to pay, she realizes that she needs to know more about Browne's interests in this arrangement and what is driving Sam's proposal. So Karen asks Sam, "Why is the revenue sharing scheme for the new program so skewed in Browne's favor?" His explanation is simple. The basic models course is a prerequisite for the advanced seminar; hence, Sam must recruit participants from the pool of applicants who had already taken the basic course, only about 10,000 people. His risks are high because he fears that the yield will be low, and his company will not sign on the numbers needed to make this venture profitable.

What catches Karen's attention is the risk profile that Sam presents. The new advanced program is more risky than the basic offering. If Sam's entire pool of possible attendees for the advanced course is limited, Browne Associates has no flexibility in marketing. The company could not recruit more attendees simply by sending out another direct-mail campaign. Rather Browne Associates must target their marketing strategies to a select group.

Karen realizes that she needs an entirely different proposal and that she should not simply engage in a series of trade-offs on amount of revenue. She suggests that they meet later after she has had time to develop alternatives. The next day she gives Sam an alternative proposal. Since Sam is concerned about the risk factor of the new program, Karen proposes that SITI's fee start low but ratchet up as the number of seminar participants increases. When enrollments reach the

number that parallels those in the basic course, SITI would receive a higher fee per attendee than they currently do for the basic course. This prorated fee compensates for SITI's revenue loss during the introductory period of the course when they are paid a low fee.

Although Sam responds positively to the idea, he believes that the incremental increase in fees is too steep. He prefers a slow phase-in of the higher fee. However, after tinkering with the revenues associated with the numbers, Karen and Sam reach an agreement. The settlement is a gain for both sides. By linking revenues to the number of attendees, the new course will move forward. Although the deal does not return as much revenue as Karen had hoped, particularly in the early stages, it will generate considerable cash flow in the future—for SITI and for Browne Associates.

#### **D. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL—MUTUAL INQUIRY AND CO-CONSTRUCTION**

When Sam hands Karen his proposal, she is shocked. SITI is a major client for Browne and their relationship has yielded other work for his company. It does not make sense that Sam would try to take advantage of SITI, even though the proposal looks like it. Karen said to herself: "I'm missing something here. We haven't talked enough. I don't understand what's going on. Sam is really upset and not just about the revenue. Maybe I do not fully understand his business."

Karen asks Sam to talk about his business in more detail. Sam tells Karen his situation. In order to recover his costs, including SITI's fixed fee, Browne needs to recruit 105 attendees for each advanced course. At the start of a mailing cycle, Sam can never predict the yield. If the numbers look low, he sends out more direct mail. Based on a formula of one attendee per one thousand mail announcements, Sam knows that he can fill the seminar if Browne sends out enough mail. Karen then realizes that she has never understood Sam's operations. His problems aren't just the fee structure. In this new arrangement, he can't use a direct mail campaign to fill the advanced course; thus, he can only approach previous participants. If not enough people sign up for the course, then he is out of pocket. This moment serves as a turning point to pursue the relationship as a basis for negotiation.

Karen mentions to Sam that she is only beginning to see how risky the advanced program is for him. That comment opens the door for Sam to become more expressive and to approach Karen in a new light. He begins to talk about the risks of his business and that he feels he has always borne all the risks in their joint ventures. "When we started," he remarks, "nobody knew the programs would be so successful. I underwrote them. Now that the programs are successful, the institute is not only unappreciative, but you want more."

Sam's unguarded remarks surface a critical element that is driving the negotiation. Both parties consider the other company greedy and each interprets the actions of the other through this screen. Karen shifts the negotiation away from competition to mutual recognition by affirming Sam. Karen talks about how much SITI values the work of Browne and his team and Sam points out how much Browne Associates appreciates SITI's contributions to making the seminars successful and effective. This affirmation makes both parties more approachable and builds connectedness in goals.



As Karen inquires more deeply into Sam's business—not just the nuts and bolts, but why he has to make the decisions he does—both parties surface past resentments, renew trust, and gain a new understanding of each other. This new understanding alters the definition and direction of the conflict. It transforms their perceptions of past behaviors and enables them to see their relationship in a new light. Through this mode of negotiation, Karen and Sam discover their real incentives for working together. Their discussion leads them to set aside the fee arrangements and build their interdependence and connectedness through thinking of ways to fill the advanced classes and to expand the pool of recruits. Karen pursues ideas related to the sequence of the courses and Sam questions why the courses need to be offered sequentially. Then they both develop the idea to offer the two courses simultaneously; thereby giving people the prerequisites while recruiting them into the advanced course. Thus, instead of promoting the new course as a stand-alone offering, they could couple it with the basic course and participants could remain for the two-day advanced program after they complete the basic course. This way Sam could approach the 10,000 existing alumni and, at the same time, prospect for new attendees for the basic course.

What is important to Karen and Sam, however, is not the outcome or solution to the problem, it is the connectedness that forms in jointly developing their course of action and in building a new sense of understanding of their situation. In effect, they transform the nature of their relationship through promoting expressiveness, appreciating each other's situation, mutual recognition and collaborative actions. Their relationship has changed because they have built a new foundation for future interactions, one that reduces suspicion and distrust, builds on common ground, and engages in a process of collaboration.

These three scenarios illustrate how the elements of negotiation function differently in each model. In the first two scenarios, exchange surfaces as the fundamental activity of negotiating. In the both the distributive and integrative models, Karen and Sam concentrate on their own rewards and costs and on balancing risks and revenues. Balance and reciprocity drive the way that each person weighs the other party's concessions and they influence the basis of the integrative agreement, as Sam and Karen haggle over the revenue figures linked to the number of attendees.

In the alternative scenario, Karen engages in mutual inquiry rather than trading by asking Sam to explain his business. This inquiry, rooted in expansive thinking, allows the parties to raise issues about their relationship and to integrate the particulars of the moment into the larger organizational system that connects the parties. The negotiators collaborate, not only in developing a creative solution, but also in surfacing their suspicions and fears about each other and in developing a sense of recognition and new understanding of each other. As they increase their appreciation for each other and their interdependence, they voice their concerns, develop communal goals, and jointly construct an outcome. Negotiation, then, becomes a co-construction rather than an exchange. These scenarios serve as exemplars to compare the goals and outcomes, relationships, and processes of the traditional and the alternative approaches.

## E. GOALS AND OUTCOMES

Goals and outcomes in the traditional models are infused with the residue of exchange. Distributive bargainers rely on exchanges to maximize individual payoffs and achieve settlements close to their opponents' resistance point. Mutual gains negotiators cast these goals as joint profits and strive to optimize gains for both parties. Consistent with the mutual gains model, bargainers aim to achieve the best optimal settlement while realizing that the other party is striving to enhance his or her position. Even though the goals of integrative bargaining include both self and other, the primary concern of enlightened self-interest remains on the individual whose payoffs are increased because joint gain is optimal. To return to our example, when Karen and Sam negotiate under the traditional models, their objectives are clear – to get the best deal that each person can. What differs between the distributive and integrative versions is the operation of enlightened self-interest. In the integrative version of the traditional model, Karen fashions an agreement that takes Sam's interest—in this case, risk—into account. The patriarchal value of individuality, then, remains primary in these approaches to negotiation.

The alternative view of bargaining strives for self-knowledge and mutual understanding rather than enlightened self-interest and mutual gain (see Figure 1, Annex). Self-knowledge differs from self-interest in the way that negotiators are positioned in the process. Enlightened self-interest presumes both parties are pursuing paths to increase their relative advantage in the situation. Self-knowledge, however, focuses on the way that co-constructing the process enlightens or informs both parties of their true needs, capabilities, and motivations. When Karen and Sam open up the negotiations and begin to hear about the experiences of the other, each learns something new about the other as well as about their own cases. Through their collaboration, they come to see their individual interests in a different light and come to define and understand their mutual interests in how each person experiences the relationship. The co-constructed model presumes that parties can learn from negotiation and become aware of their own interests as a result of engaging in the bargaining. The major goal of the alternative model is not mutual gain, but rather mutual understanding through generating new insights, creating alternative meanings, and expanding horizons. These goals, then, embrace the feminist quality of learning through connectedness.

In the traditional model, the outcome of negotiation is closely tied to the goals of the process. The ultimate resolution of bargaining is a mutually satisfactory settlement, particularly an optimal one in which “neither party can do better in an alternative agreement unless the other party does worse” (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993, p. 83). A major limitation to treating agreement as the ultimate outcome of bargaining is the way this end drives other features of the process. Negotiation, then, as a complex process of social interaction, becomes an instrument for attaining agreement. Interdependence occurs around the task, not the relationship. In an interesting irony, when interdependence is rooted in the task, the very kinds of creative options that might emerge as solutions are not realized because the parties concentrate on outcomes and the instrumental nature of their talk. Thus, in traditional model II, when Karen proposes a deal that takes Sam's risk into account, Sam remains suspicious and concerned that the terms of this agreement will favor SITI. The emphasis on reaching an agreement and on different types of outcomes, such as win-lose, lose-lose, or win-win, supports the instrumental nature of the process.

Rather than striving for optimal settlements, a model of negotiation based on feminist thinking aims for outcomes rooted in jointly developed courses of action that have the potential to transform the situation. Transformation implies a disjunction or break in preconceived ways of thinking about issues, positions, and relationships (Putnam, 1994). A negotiation that works through the changes that occur in understandings and meanings about issues, relationship, and future actions has the potential to become different than it was originally conceived. Outcomes in the alternative model are not simply prefigured inputs that have been exchanged, rearranged, and repackaged. Rather they arise from changes in fundamental understandings of the situation and the participants.

In the alternative scenario, when Karen and Sam jointly develop a definition and solution to the problem, it represents a new co-construction of their individual views of the situation. Even though the initial purpose of their meeting is to negotiate SITI's fee for the advanced courses, they co-construct a new understanding and they rework the problem. This process, in turn, leads to significantly different feelings about the agreement. It is not the nature of the outcome itself that is radically different in the alternative model. Clearly, the solution of offering both courses simultaneously could have emerged from integrative or principled negotiation. However, the joint or collaborative discovery of developing the solution arises from changes in the relationship and in the ways that parties work through their conflict.

Transformative outcomes are inextricably tied to how a dispute is defined and enacted. Specifically, transformation often occurs in the way a conflict is labeled or named, the process of blame and accusation tied to the dispute, and the ownership of the conflict (Mather & Yngvesson, 1980/1981). Through negotiating, parties in a dispute may come to frame or label the conflict differently. What was initially defined as a conflict about employer contributions to health insurance might emerge from the interaction as a problem with the health care provider or the nature of the health care package. A conflict about the implementation of training and diversity programs in an organization might transform into concerns about fundamental values in the company culture.

Other levels of transformation address the blaming and claiming of a conflict. Parties often approach a dispute by blaming other people for the problem. Sometimes the conflict interaction focuses on who caused this problem or who has contributed to the development of these difficulties. Moving from blaming others to owning the causes and effects of a situation illustrates a transformative moment in the dispute. When Sam and Karen negotiate about the fees, they still hold mutual assumptions about the greed and exploitation of the other. In the background, these feelings impact the kind of deal that can be made. When they work through these feelings and recognize the contribution each person makes to the situation, their insights into the problem changes and their collective ability to create options changes as well. Through deliberation and reflection, parties claim or own the problem in new ways; outcomes, then, evolve from different explanations and understandings of the situation than parties originally held.

Transformation also occurs when parties understand how problems are rooted in social systems in which both disputants are embedded. In the alternative approach, the solution that Karen and Sam collectively generate comes from moving away from proposals and thinking about the

larger social system that they are developing. Thus, rather than aiming for win-win or win-lose outcomes, negotiators in the alternative model seek an enriched understanding of the very situation they are constructing. Jointly developed actions then emanate from changes in expectations, explanations, and understandings of the conflict. They grow out of the interaction during the negotiation rather than initiate the process through goals brought into the dispute. Change and transformation are outgrowths of the process of discovery and mutual understanding rather than the culmination of exchanges. The evolutionary nature of the conflict, then, may lead to transformation, but transformation cannot be imposed on the conflict. The synergy of the process produces a transformation, not the superiority of arguments, effectiveness of trades, or the optimal nature of the settlement.

## **F. RELATIONSHIPS**

One primary difference between the traditional and the alternative models of negotiation is the role of relationships. While exchange and outcomes function as the foci of the traditional model, relationships and process move to center stage in the alternative model. In the traditional model, relationships serve instrumental ends through helping bargainers reach an optimal solution. Sam Browne is a businessman and Karen Davenport represents an important client. They have a mutual interest in continuing that lucrative relationship. Consistent with patriarchal assumptions, negotiators are distant, independent, and autonomous. The “other” person in this model constitutes a bundle of interests, needs, and goals that are discrete and distant from one’s own needs. In both traditional models, Karen takes the lead in trying to figure out what Sam needs and she proposes solutions based on her assumptions about these needs.

The alternative model, in contrast, adopts the feminist goal of connecting as the basis of relationships (Fletcher, 1998). The other person is not simply a bundle of interests, goals, and needs; this person is someone to join with, learn from, and create a unique experience. Hence, bargainers connect with the other person to form a relationship through the process of negotiating. In the alternative scenario, Karen opens up the possibility of examining the relationship when she inquires about Sam’s past experiences and frustrations in implementing the courses. Through the negotiation, they start to shape a different relationship—it is still rooted in business, but it becomes defined as a collaborative partnership rather than an instrumental connection. By attending to the relationship, bargainers become attuned to ways of nurturing each other.

Clearly, self-disclosure and expressiveness have the potential to result in conflict escalation. Although a fine line exists between expressiveness and defensiveness, attending to the relationship places negotiators in a position to promote inquiry and probe their joint situation. For example, if Karen had responded to Sam’s comment with defensiveness rather than sensing Sam’s needs and frustrations, the conflict might have escalated when Sam said, “the institute is not only unappreciative but wants more.” By attending to the relationship, Karen seeks to move the conflict in a different direction, one that may not work in all situations. Karen, however, is not taking a major risk to pursue a relational approach first.

In the traditional model, individuals act independently to make decisions, but they depend on the other party to achieve their respective goals. Interdependence, then, is predetermined and instrumental, derived extrinsically through mutual efforts toward interrelated goals (Blau, 1964).

In the traditional scenarios, even though Sam and Karen talk about their mutual dependence, it is a dependence based on the exigencies of the situation. Indeed, under this model, negotiation strategists might advise Karen to develop alternative ways to deliver SITI's programs so that SITI would not be totally dependent on Browne Associates.

Contrary to the traditional models, interdependence forms the bond for building relationships in the alternative view. Rather than being predetermined and defined instrumentally, interdependence is co-constructed and emerges through the process of bargaining (see Figure 1, Annex). Sam and Karen get to see how their mutual actions implicate the other company and create the conditions of distance and mistrust in their business relationship. These disclosures lead to a reframing of the relationship; the two parties begin to see each other differently. By probing underlying reasons for actions, Karen and Sam meet each other on new ground with deeper levels of inquiry about their situation (Bakhtin, 1981). Consistent with a feminist orientation, in the alternative model, relationships are defined intrinsically as parties acquire new understandings of each other and their respective situation. Rather than being driven by instrumental goals, both parties are expressive and open to the possibilities of learning something that they do not already know.

In like manner, issues of trust differ between the traditional and the alternative models of negotiation. In the traditional models, trust and distrust function through a competitive/cooperative lens. Motivations to cooperate stem from sharing a common fate; motivations to compete emanate from the desire for maximum gain (Rubin & Brown, 1975). In this situation, trust develops through opening moves that set the tone for cooperation, making concessions during the process, demonstrating similarities to the other party, and accepting the other parties' ideas and suggestions (Micheline, 1971; Swinth, 1967).

By rooting trust in cooperative/competitive orientations, negotiators adhere to a view of social relations defined by commodity exchange (Hartsock, 1985). Bargainers are isolated individuals who meet in an initial atmosphere of suspicion for the purpose of enhancing self-gain. They move toward cooperation to achieve the best bargain and to maintain their mutual association. Although individuals oscillate between cooperation and competition, connections between the parties are instrumental and are defined by domination rather than by a sense of community (Hartsock, 1985).

Although integrative bargaining is designed to build trust, negotiators share information and engage in joint problem solving through making trust serve instrumental ends. Trust, if it can really be said to exist, becomes a tool to grease the skid of exchange (Gray, 1994). Negotiators may take risks to engage in joint problem solving, but this activity places trust in the task and the incremental moves of bargaining rather than in the relationship (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). In traditional models, mutual distrust characterizes Sam and Karen's interactions. Each negotiator thinks the other person only works for his or her own company and is out to make a deal at the other party's expense. They cooperate to make a deal but the nature of their interdependence remains fundamentally unchanged.

Feminist theory would suggest an alternative model of social relations, one rooted in connection and empathy. In this model, trust emanates from confidence in the process, one that grows from a shared commitment to the interaction. Trust building occurs from coming together,

discovering new understanding, rejecting stereotypes and prejudices, and forming common ground through co-constructed meanings (LeBaron & Carstarphen, 1997; Notter, 1995). The seeds of empathy are planted in the process of connecting and in being open to the mutual understanding that both could create. In the alternative model, Karen legitimates Sam's feelings about his contributions to the success of their joint enterprise. Nurturing his feelings of being misunderstood, her inquiry and desire to hear about his experiences encourages him to be forthcoming. The negotiators internalize the other party's interpretations of issues and events and generate different ideas from the way each person comes to understand the issues (Becker, Chasin, L., Chasin, R., Heraiz, M., & Roth, 1995). As empathy develops, negotiators operate from a mode of inquiry rooted in appreciation rather than suspicion (Barrett & Cooperrider, 1990). Thus, the parties move from distrust to trust through building a connected relationship and a shared reality rather than from oscillating between competition and cooperation.

The traditional models also cast relationships as rational. Emotional or expressive goals are either devalued within bargaining relationships or they serve instrumental ends. Bargainers are advised to remain detached from their opponent, to get beyond feelings, and to separate people from the problem (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Nierenberg, 1973). Emotional expressions in traditional bargaining block clear thinking and make it difficult for a negotiator to process information effectively (Daly, 1991; Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). When emotions enter into the traditional models they often serve instrumental ends. Positive affect becomes valued in negotiation, not because it grows out of relationships, but because it influences creative problem solving, lowers contentious tactics, and increases cooperative behaviors (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Thompson, 1998).

In contrast, sharing feelings and experiences are important factors that contribute to effective negotiation in the alternative model. A feminist lens would suggest that understanding and mutual inquiry emanate from experiential and affective dimensions of conflict (Kolb & Coolidge, 1991). Rather than being the opposite of reason, emotions are ways in which individuals know the world, reflect on and evaluate it, and change their perceptions about it (Buzzanell, 1994; Ferguson, 1984). Emotional moments in negotiation may represent turning points or shifts in the nature of a conflict. For Sam and Karen in the alternative scenario, the sharing of feelings opened up the process. For the first time they could appreciate the perspectives that each person brought to the table. These moments of recognition form the groundwork for periods of ambivalence in which parties can pursue new understandings and joint courses of action (Putnam, 1994).

In summary, relationships in the traditional models take a back stage to instrumental goals and outcomes. Negotiators remain distant from one another and act as autonomous decision-makers. They approach each other with suspicion and vacillate between competition and cooperation in their search for mutual gain. Bargaining relationships, then, are rational and defined extrinsically through the need to reach a mutually dependent end. In contrast, the alternative model, rooted in feminist thinking, places relationships at the center of the process. Bargainers enact their interdependence through connecting with each other, building trust from co-constructed meanings, and discovering new insights from empathy and appreciation. Feelings and shared experiences are ways in which negotiators learn about each other and their situation rather than being used instrumentally as a path to desired ends.

## G. NEGOTIATION PROCESS

The process of negotiation has a direct influence on the relationships, goals and outcomes of this activity. In the negotiation literature, process surfaces in two ways: as the execution of bargaining and as the social interaction that enacts negotiation. This section compares traditional and alternative models in each of these two areas.

### *1. As Bargaining Activity*

Three types of activities characterize process in traditional bargaining models: exchanging proposals and counterproposals, giving concessions, and engaging in problem solving. The exchange processes that dominate traditional models of negotiation influence how proposals are developed, initiated, accepted, and rejected. Proposals refer to the positions that parties hold on issues or their recommendations for action. Basically, proposals are placed on the table as offers that delimit the scope and nature of counteroffers. In the distributive scenario, Karen and Sam confine their negotiation to trading offers and counteroffers of the fee that SITI will receive from the advanced course. Sam presents Karen with an offer to which she responds with a counteroffer. Their negotiation centers on the justifications of each party's positions. Sam contends that this program is different, more risky than the basic course; therefore, he needs to cover his potential losses by retaining a large share of the revenues. In turn, Karen rejects this idea and sets forth a proposal of her own. The activity of bargaining in the traditional models is confined to a narrow band of ideas and concepts, basically it centers on the commodity under discussion.

Disputants in the alternative model offer perspectives or alternative understandings rather than proposals and counterproposals (see Figure 1, Annex). Rooted in feminist thinking, the giving of perspectives treats ideas as the expression of viewpoints (Foss & Griffin, 1995). Unlike proposals, perspectives are tentative notions that represent works in progress. A perspective is one of many legitimate viewpoints expressed; it is the offering of an idea that is different from advocating or seeking support of it. The offering of a personal experience or story is not used as evidence to support a position—it is simply the giving of a perspective. The sharing of stories in the alternative scenario reveals different information than is exchanged in the monetary proposals and justifications for them. Sam's story about his relationship with SITI reveals to Karen how and why he is approaching the negotiation in this manner and shares the issues that form the roots of his concerns. Likewise Sam is able to understand Karen's perspective and why SITI needs to explore proposals that look beyond the short run. Both parties come to understand that any deal has to recognize the life cycle of the seminars, the way that both companies do business, and their mutual goals of filling the classes.

Rather than exchanging concessions, negotiators in the alternative model respond through a process of "re-sourcement" or drawing energy from a different frame or source than the one in which the initial proposals were made (Gearhart, 1982). Parties in the alternative model switch "frameworks, assumptions, and principles" from those suggested by their previous messages (Foss & Griffin, 1995, p. 9). For conflict scholars, this process resembles reframing or the act of altering fields of vision, interpretive schemes, and ways parties come to understand their situation (Bartunek, 1988; Putnam & Holmer, 1992). It entails acquiring new insights, learning

new premises, and altering cues in the social context (Bateson, 1972). By responding with possibilities rather than concessions, parties expand the options available to them and envision possibilities never realized through enacting traditional models of negotiation. Another advantage of engaging in re-sourcing or reframing is freeing the parties from “face” concerns linked to concession making in traditional negotiation. In the alternative model, Karen and Sam shift their conversation from proposals to the problems of risk and marketing strategy. As they draw on this new source or frame, their understanding of the problem changes. They are not simply splitting revenues or expanding the pie, rather they reframe their task, redefine their mutual problem, and shift the foci of their negotiation.

Another difference between the traditional and the alternative models is the notion of problem solving (see Figure 1, Annex). As the fundamental activity of integrative bargaining, problem solving fosters brainstorming and bridging solutions, addresses the needs of both sides, and facilitates creative solutions (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985). Although problem solving is not typically regarded as a gendered activity, many aspects of this process parallel patriarchal values of rationality; namely, isolation of problems into discrete parts, use of sequential or linear steps, and defense of particular solutions (Barrett, 1995). The discrete parts of problem solving typically include, defining the problem, searching for causes, brainstorming solutions, generating criteria, and selecting the best solution. By isolating components into parts, critics contend that problem solving ignores the systemic and interactive nature of issues, consequently distancing problems from their context in time and space (Baruch Bush & Folger, 1994). This segmentation of steps also promotes a linear rather than a holistic approach to analyzing situations.

Moreover, dwelling on problems often closes off exploration by reducing the discussion to concerns that have been labeled as a problem. These deficiencies suggest that problem solving as a mode of inquiry is limited in producing the knowledge that is necessary for fundamental change (Barrett, 1995). In the integrative scenario, Karen and Sam engage in problem solving. Both of them interact about Sam’s problem of risk, and they propose a solution that links the fee compensation to numbers of participants. This integrative solution represents a cost compensation approach that appears to be a good package for both bargainers. However, the negotiation then switches from the activity to the social interaction that will make the deal acceptable to both parties. Because Sam and Karen remain in a tug of war about the sharing of revenues, Karen initiates and owns the deal, leaving Sam suspicious as to whether his interests are truly served in the process. Although the deal meets mutual interests, the bargaining process revolves around revenue sharing.

The alternative model of negotiation relies on dialogue rather than problem solving for generating options. Dialogue aims to join with the other person in connective thinking and envisioning alternative courses of action (Bohm, 1996). It is a joint enterprise or a genuine meeting in which people co-develop explanations and options through probing underlying assumptions and reasons why these assumptions operate as they do. Dialogue aims to transform the conversation by centering on presumptions that people bring to situations and by creating something additive that never existed before (Isaacs, 1993; Johannesen, 1971). As a process of interaction, dialogue focuses on the system as a whole through a type of synergy created from the collective construction of the parties (Evered & Tannenbaum, 1992). In the alternative



scenario, Karen and Sam engage in a connected dialogue that broadens the nature of their conversation. They begin with the situation, move to the relationship, and then advance to a redefinition of the problem. As each tries to understand the problem from the other party's perspective, they acquire a more detailed understanding of their situation and shift their foci on the problem. Their new problem, as they now mutually define and own it, is not how to split the revenues from the advanced course, but how to increase the marketing base so that their shared risk can be reduced.

A dialogic model of negotiation may seem like an oxymoron in that dialogue, in one sense, involves mutual openness, high levels of trust and disclosure, and empathetic listening (Buber, 1958), elements that rarely enter into high conflict situations. However, another approach to dialogue, not necessarily aimed at openness, grows out of conflicting viewpoints and even adversarial relationships. This approach treats dialogue as a process of cooling down, suspending views, mutual learning, and appreciating (Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; Isaacs, 1993; Johannesen, 1996; LeBaron & Carstarphen, 1997). Logically, in a traditional negotiation, Sam and Karen would not discuss issues that threaten their legitimacy in the other party's eyes. In the alternative model, dialogue, then, unites with the feminist processes of connecting and offering perspectives to alter the very nature and direction of negotiation. Collective actions and joint proposals typically emerge from dialogue, but these endeavors are not the ends that drive the process. Engaging in dialogue becomes both the means and the ends of the activity.

## 2. *As Social Interaction*

The two models of negotiation differ in the form of social interaction that characterizes each approach. Debate as the type of discourse that typifies the traditional model, consists of pro and con arguments and rebuttals aimed at reinforcing one's own position and refuting the opponent's claims (Keough, 1992; Putnam & Geist, 1985; Putnam, Wilson, & Turner, 1990). With the avowed purpose of winning, debate tends to close off interaction by encouraging parties to defend their positions and suppress doubts about the validity of their views. As a mode of discourse in traditional negotiation, debate may increase competition when parties match attack and defense patterns (Putnam & Jones, 1982). Hence, debate, as the dominant discourse in negotiation, may be problematic as a venue for fundamental change. The interaction of Karen and Sam in the first two examples relies heavily on argumentation and debate. Each negotiator tries to convince the other of the veracity of his or her position. In the distributive model, both parties argue that their view on the fee allocation is right, fair, and appropriate. In the integrative model, Karen attacks Sam's position and strives to win him over to her perspective.

The alternative model posits a different process, deliberation, as a mode of social interaction for negotiation (see Figure 1, Annex). Deliberation is a precursor to dialogue in that as parties begin to discuss their needs, they "weigh out" their views by sorting out the ones with which they can agree and disagree. This "weighing out," however, differs from the discourse of "attack-defend" that characterizes debate (Isaacs, 1993). Deliberation opens up thoughts for reflection. It also promotes invitational rhetoric, a process that centers on sharing knowledge, thinking critically about ideas, and creating understanding (Foss & Griffin, 1995). Grounded in feminist principles, parties are invited to enter each other's worlds and to bring a new sense of awareness to the situation. By appreciating multiple perspectives, parties validate the communication process,

even if they disagree on issues. Invitational rhetoric also expands thinking through appreciative inquiry. This approach urges participants to move beyond the here and now issues and raise questions about peak experiences; times of exceptional performance; and what people value most about their lives, careers, and work (Barrett, 1995; Barrett & Cooperrider, 1995).

In the alternative model, Sam voices his concern of taking all the risks and being in competition with SITI for revenues and Karen expresses her feelings that Browne Associates gets more than the lion's share of the profits. The process of appreciative inquiry is critical in changing these perceptions. Through asking questions about Sam's business, Karen can begin to understand how and why Sam might feel that SITI has taken advantage of him. Karen can share her appreciation for Sam's contributions while she discloses her suspicions about Sam and her concern for covering costs of the course delivery. As they talk, Sam and Karen develop a new awareness of their situation. Karen gains a new appreciation for Sam and the role of Browne Associates in the basic course seminars and Sam begins to understand why Karen might think he is taking advantage of SITI.

The alternative perspective challenges two additional features of negotiation, information exchange and the use of strategies and tactics (see Figure 1, Annex). Information exchange in traditional bargaining focuses on the amount of information shared, truthfulness or completeness of the information, and ways for gleaning information from one's opponent (Putnam & Jones, 1982). Information is shared in both tacit and explicit ways and parties distinguish between the giving and the seeking of information in negotiations. The feminist critique of exchange applies to information management in bargaining. In the traditional models, information functions as a commodity or a material good which bargainers acquire and own. The ability of a negotiator to accumulate more facts and manipulate the information environment is often an index of bargaining success (Donohue & Diez, 1985). Even though honest disclosure of information is vital to the effectiveness of integrative bargaining, information is treated primarily as a transaction, one in which data is transmitted to enhance enlightened self-interest or mutual gains.

In the traditional models, bargaining strategies and tactics are also traded, reciprocated, and matched (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998; Donohue, Diez, & Hamilton, 1984). A strategy refers to a broad plan or an overall approach that a negotiator pursues. Strategy is linked to exchange in that it directs the patterns of offers and counteroffers, it influences use of persuasive appeals, and it affects concession making. For example, a strategy of toughness in negotiation entails the exchange of extreme opening offers, small concessions, high expectations, and an unyielding posture (Bartos, 1970). Bargainers also exchange tactics that influence an opponent's perceptions of target and resistance points, for example, the use of threats, commitment statements, and demands. These exchanges foster the goals of competition and control, by promoting relative advantage of one negotiator over the other. Sam and Karen play this game in both traditional versions of their negotiation. Neither trusts the other and is out to get a larger share of the pie.

The patriarchal nature of strategies and tactics is also evident in their linguistic ties to military metaphors (Gray, 1994). In military vernacular, strategies and tactics are maneuvers or game plans that negotiators develop to improve their positions for attack or defense. They are designed to leverage the opponent and bring negotiation strength to bear at the right time (Ruben

& Brown, 1975). The language of conquest permeates traditional bargaining literature with phrases like, “weaken the opponent’s stand,” “stockpile resources,” “tacit warnings,” “aggressive and non-aggressive tactics,” and “coercive maneuvers” (Wall, 1985). This integration of military images with the exchange process continues to root negotiation in a masculine environment in which the attack/defend model of social interaction is the dominant discourse.

An alternative social process highlights what is often marginalized in traditional models of negotiation—sharing experiences (see Figure 1, Annex). Sharing experiences entails the use of personal narratives, descriptions of incidents and events, and discussions about personal feelings (Foss & Griffin, 1995). Sharing life stories connects people through revealing common values, beliefs, and emotions. In this approach, experiences are not shared simply to fortify positions or provide evidence for a claim. Each perspective in storytelling is unique; hence, sharing experiences is not subjected to argument or agreement/disagreement (LeBaron & Carstarphen, 1997). The goal of sharing experiences, then, is not to convert someone to another position, but to come to a new understanding through extending each other’s ideas.

Rather than exchanging strategies and tactics, the alternative model sets forth a process known as circular questioning (Cobb, 1993; Fleuridas, C., Nelson, T., & Rosenthal, C. 1986). Drawn from therapeutic discourse, circular questions are a series of queries that collectively create interdependence. This discourse moves from personal narratives and experiences to analysis of situations in ways that remove blame from the process. Questions such as how did a problem begin? What happened before? When did you notice this difficulty? Interaction, then, moves in a circular fashion to inquire about events, actors, themes, and time factors in the sharing of experiences. Stories begin to break their original structure and coherence when participants collectively ask questions that alter time frames, characters, and plots of situations (Cobb, 1993).

Karen uses a strategy of circular questioning when she negotiates in the alternative model. First she asks questions about Sam’s business and then reinforces what she learns about his work. As he shares his experiences, she acknowledges his risks and the way that it functions with SITI. He tells a story that places Browne Associates as the victim in their joint ventures. Sam’s story gives Karen an opportunity to tell SITI’s version of their relationship and together they come to appreciate not only their mutual interests but also their commitment to solve the problem and improve the trust in their relationship. Questions such as what people value, what they want to learn from the situation, and how this situation relates to the larger system in which they function combine circular questioning with promoting appreciative inquiry. Circular questions aid in keeping each person’s story open to alternative interpretations (Cobb, 1994).

Negotiation as a ritualistic process is so familiar that theorists often refer to it as a “conflict rite,” “a dance,” and “a game of chess” (Hocker & Wilmot, 1995). The process is so automatic that few people question the legitimacy of debate as the form of social interaction that dominates the process. Nearly every textbook on negotiation includes sections on strategies and tactics and the role of information exchange in reaching integrative agreements. These processes, however, are wedded to a set of assumptions limited by a view of negotiation as an exchange. The enactment of an alternative model must rely on radically different forms of social interaction. That interaction is rooted in dialogue and centers on deliberation, invitational rhetoric, sharing experiences, storytelling, and circular questioning as the fundamental patterns of communication.

The solution that Karen and Sam generate cannot be separated from the process of negotiating. They derive an agreement through mutual understanding and jointly developing a solution, not through incremental concessions or finding a mutual gains deal. As Sam shares his experiences and his feelings about the relationship, Karen opens up about SITI's resentment over the existing fee arrangement. As they begin sharing, they set aside their suspicions, listen to, and learn from each other. The traditional models of negotiation give lipservice to the notion of partnership. In the alternative model, Sam and Karen actually experience their relationship as partners who are jointly defining and developing their mutual project.

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## VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

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Negotiation is not simply the process of making trades, it is an activity in which conflicting ideas form the basis for questioning, integrating issues within the larger system, representing multiple voices, and producing joint action. This alternative for thinking about negotiation stands in contrast to traditional approaches. Exchange forms the foundation that underlies traditional bargaining—the goals and outcomes, relationships, activity, and social interaction.

We contend that exchange and negotiation are gendered activities in that both processes privilege attributes typically identified with patriarchal values. Specifically, exchange casts commodity, cost-benefit ratios, and utilities as rational, materialistic, and objective approaches to decision making. The principles that underlie exchange such as reciprocity, balance, equity, and transaction also reflect a gender bias through relying on agentic goals and reasoning from universal principles. The goals and outcomes of bargaining highlight the instrumentality of a continual drive to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement.

Relationships in the traditional models reaffirm this gender bias through an emphasis on distance, instrumentality, and rationality. Bargainers are treated as autonomous decision-makers that develop interdependence extrinsically through vacillating between competition and cooperation. Emotions and feelings are either overpowered by rational processes or are coopted to serve instrumental ends. Exchanging proposals and concessions functions from the principles of reciprocity and balance. Problem solving in integrative negotiation privileges rationality and the reduction of interrelated issues into isolated segments.

The alternative model of negotiation, influenced by feminist thinking, accentuates those features that are marginalized in traditional models. Treating negotiation as co-construction elevates relationships to the center stage. Employing dialogue as the primary grounds negotiation interaction in community, mutual understanding, and connectedness. The alternative model operates from the principle of equality to strive for integration, collaboration, and mutual inquiry among diverse voices. Negotiation becomes the process of building a relationship, one that strives for mutual recognition and empathy. The type of interaction that characterizes the alternative model is sharing experiences, offering perspectives, deliberating about ideas, telling personal narratives, engaging in circular questioning, and envisioning through re-sourcement and reframing. These forms of social interaction support the feminist practices of intuition, expressiveness, and shared feelings that are typically absent in traditional approaches.

This comparison of traditional and alternative models stems from prototypes, that is, from coherent and isomorphic views of each category. Deviations from these prototypes are more likely the rule rather than the exception. The dichotomous representation of each exaggerates the differences between them. This analysis, however, uncovers marginalized and unappreciated aspects of negotiation, ones that are often ignored in the traditional literature. Thus, the traditional and the alternative models are presented as extremes to differentiate between the two approaches, even though the traditional models vary in form and function across types of bargaining.

For some scholars, the alternative model of negotiation may appear to be an entirely different form of social interaction, e.g., therapeutic discourse, social support interaction, or personal conversation. The proposed alternative, however, does not abandon the fundamental features of negotiation—perceived incompatible goals, interdependence, expressed struggle, mixed motive nature, and potential interference in achieving one’s goal (Hocker & Wilmot, 1995). These features enter into the alternative model, but function in different ways than they do in the traditional models.

Co-construction as an alternative view of negotiation is not an approach that replaces traditional models nor is it one that can be used in every bargaining encounter. Some situations that seem particularly appropriate for using this model include: informal work negotiations, bargaining in long-term relationships, role negotiations, and even intractable disputes. In any negotiation, parties can begin from a point of mutuality. In some and perhaps many cases, the other person will connect through pursuing goals, strategies, and processes that differ from traditional models. However, if the other person refuses to engage, to pursue mutual inquiry, and to share mutual recognition, a negotiator can resort to traditional options. Mutual inquiry means that both parties must take risks to engage in a relational orientation to negotiation.

Even though the alternative model may seem unconventional and far-reaching, other theorists have presented similar perspectives on mediation (Baruch Bush & Folger, 1994), legal negotiations (Menkel-Meadow, 1994; Williams, 1996); and workplace dispute resolution (Gwartney-Gibbs & Lach, 1994). These perspectives explore the limitations of problem solving mediation; the links between negotiation and the healing process; and the need to examine institutional structures that contribute to dispute management practices. This critique of traditional models of negotiation adds to a growing body of literature aimed at developing options and possibilities that are not easily co-opted into the dominant orientation. The development of a truly alternative model of negotiation, one that is rooted in non-patriarchal values, is essential to enhancing the discipline’s ability to explain communication in conflict management. This essay takes another step forward in advancing this goal by presenting an alternative to the dominant theories of negotiation, one rooted in feminist thinking and principles.

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A COMPARISON OF NEGOTIATION MODELS

TRADITIONAL MODEL	ALTERNATIVE MODEL
<p><b>Exchange</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trades</li> <li>Reciprocity</li> <li>Balance</li> <li>Equity</li> <li>Transaction</li> </ul>	<p><b>Co-Construction</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mutual Inquiry</li> <li>Integration</li> <li>Blended</li> <li>Equality</li> <li>Collaboration</li> </ul>
<p><b>Goals</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Enlightened Self-interest</li> <li>Mutual Gain</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Self-Knowledge</li> <li>Mutual Understanding</li> </ul>
<p><b>Outcomes</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Settlement</li> <li>Agreements</li> <li>Win-Lose, Win-Win, Lose-Lose</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transformation</li> <li>Jointly Developed Actions</li> <li>Changing Conflict</li> </ul>
<p><b>Relationships</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Other as Distant</li> <li>Interdependence Through Desired Ends</li> <li>Extrinsic</li> <li>Instrumental</li> <li>Cooperative/Competitive Motivation</li> <li>Trust/Distrust</li> <li>Rational</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Other as Approachable</li> <li>Interdependence Through Connectedness</li> <li>Intrinsic</li> <li>Expressive</li> <li>Motivated Through Mutual Recognition</li> <li>Empathy</li> <li>Emotional</li> </ul>
<p><b>Process As Activity</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proposals/Counterproposals</li> <li>Making Concession</li> <li>Problem-Solving</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Offering Perspectives</li> <li>Re-Sourcement/Reframing</li> <li>Dialogue</li> </ul>
<p><b>Process As Social Interaction</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Debate</li> <li>Information Exchange</li> <li>Strategies and Tactics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Deliberation and Invitational Rhetoric</li> <li>Sharing Experiences</li> <li>Expressions and Circular Questions</li> </ul>