SIMULTANEITY AND THE LIMITS OF SISTERHOOD IN ONE WOMEN’S MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATION

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Based on interviews, observations, and a review of the organization’s printed materials conducted during the 2002-2003 programming year, this paper utilizes a variety of theoretical rubrics to explore the impact of Women in International Security (WIIS), a Washington, D.C.-based membership organization. By re-storising the organization within broader contexts of political philosophy and social history, I attempt to shed light on some of the incongruities latent in WIIS’s efforts to both support elite power structures and increase women’s access to these structures. This study concludes that some of the values and behaviors thought to foster a sense of sorority within the professional sector of foreign and defense policy are not conducive to the values and behaviors which would support women as civic actors engaged in realizing democratic political regimes.

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The Boston Consortium, a working group of five academic centers in the greater Boston area, was created to change the political and academic understanding of the security field so that the dynamics of gender become salient at all points in the conflict process, from prevention through post-conflict reconstruction. The program, initiated in September 2002, is comprised of five participating centers:

- Women and Public Policy Program of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government
- Carr Center for Human Rights Policy of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government
- Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy
- Center for Gender in Organizations at the Simmons School of Management
- Program on Peace and Justice at Wellesley College
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND AUTHOR’S NOTE

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The author would like to acknowledge the wise women of WIIS, whose unwavering generosity and candor enabled this research project to proceed in the midst of an administratively tumultuous year, and especially the facilitative efforts of Molly McLean of the WIIS staff. The organizational issues facing WIIS are by no means peculiar to that organization; rather, they are endemic among women’s professional membership organizations founded during the 1980s. While the remedies and readings I propose are uniquely my own, arising as they do from my roots in women’s and peace studies, the organizational issues addressed in this study all originally surfaced as salient for WIIS during my conversations with members and staff or during those public events held by WIIS that I was able to attend.
I. INTRODUCTION

The late eighties were a heady time for progressives thinking about national defense and international relations from within the United States. At the 1986 Iceland Summit, Mikhail Gorbachev made the first of what would be many repeated offers to eliminate the Soviet Union’s stockpile of nuclear weapons. Despite Ronald Reagan’s steadfast dream of “Star Wars” and concomitant failure to fully engage in disarmament negotiations, it seemed like at least one half of the Cold War binary was finally getting the big picture—choosing to reverse the slow suffocation of domestic economies under the weight of bloated defense budgets, the siphoning away of urgently needed scientific and technological expertise from pressing environmental threats. The popular Nuclear Freeze movement had raised expectations of a “peace dividend” while also raising the profile of the women in its leadership. When Jessica Tuchman Mathews’s article “Redefining Security” appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, arguing that financial and ecological interdependencies had rendered national sovereignty obsolete as a benchmark for assessing human security, policymakers took notice.

My proposition, in what follows, is that the emergence of the “human security” paradigm in the 1990s restructured the professional milieu of foreign and defense policy in ways that allowed for more participation by more women than ever before. “Human security” reframes the question organizing the field, and thereby redraws the boundaries of the field itself. Whereas “national security,” the paradigm supported by “structural realists,” asks how to secure the sovereignty of the nation-state, “human security” asks instead how to enhance the life chances of the state’s citizenry (King and Murray, 2001-2). Under the hegemony of the “national security” paradigm, military experience often served as the final arbiter of expertise, but solving the “human security” dilemma required expertise from a wide range of fields, including public health, civil administration, and agriculture, to name just a few. As a result, women interested in international relations no longer needed to fit themselves into a pipeline overtly hostile to their presence, but could instead enter the conversation from their established bases of expertise and professional power.

It was around this time that a group of Washington-based colleagues banded together to create Women in International Security (WIIS), an organization dedicated to “increasing the role of women in foreign and defense affairs by raising their numbers and visibility.” As a means of accomplishing this goal, WIIS developed a menu of programs focused on showcasing the expertise of women already established in the security field and on providing career advice to women entering these professions.

The purpose of WIIS has never been to change the way foreign, defense, or security policy is made or to affect the content or outcomes of such policies. Although no one knows yet what kinds of decisions gender parity in policymaking bodies might produce, there are good reasons to believe that the particular strategies WIIS adopted to “increase the role of women” would not necessarily decrease the use of military force, the incidence of armed conflict, or the amount of war-related human pain and suffering in the world. While public opinion surveys conducted within the United States continue to reveal a gender gap, with women more reluctant than men to endorse or support the use of military force as tool of foreign policy (Nincic and Nincic, 2002),...
these findings are overridden by the tendency of professionals of both sexes working in the institutions most involved in drafting, operationalizing, and implementing foreign and security policy to support military interventions (McGlen and Sarkees, 1993). In other words, the opinion gap between professionals and citizens is more pronounced than the difference between men and women in the population at large; or, conversely, the “gender gap” may be in part a function of the absence of women’s involvement in the machineries of war. These findings correspond to the findings of democratic peace theorists who hold that democracies are more peaceful because an empowered citizenry is likely to act to restrain its leadership from warlike behavior (Benoit, 1996).

On the other hand, individuals whose professional statuses are imbricated in institutions that depend on the perception of foreign threats for their justification, have much to lose should such institutions become less prominent, less important in the overall administration of a nation-state. Further, by their very status as policy elites, such individuals are likely to enjoy a lifestyle and personal expectations buttressed by significant privately held wealth and investment. In a highly privatized market economy, such professionals potentially have much to lose from “peace”. As WIIS Executive Board member Jane Holl Lute recently remarked, “[to] the degree to which women integrate themselves into the institutions of governance, into the institutions of the military, I think that something happens… Yes, women change the institutions, but the institutions change the women.” Studies of other policy-producing venues, such as legislative bodies, have suggested that “professionalization” itself mitigates against collaboration, motivating individuals to demonstrate their “exceptionalism” or leadership by racking up personal initiatives and accomplishments rather than working in peer relationships with others to devise the most adequate policy response (Rosenthal, 1998). The particular performance pressures of a professionalized environment exact a disproportionate toll on women, when women constitute a minority or token presence in the workplace (Rosenthal, 1997).

However, real people live a simultaneity of identities. WIIS chooses to strengthen only its members’ identification as professionals, but there is nothing in WIIS’s mission statement to prohibit the organization from bolstering its members’ identification as democratic citizens by, for example, fostering robust political participation among them. Such support would not necessarily take the organization into the arena of partisanship; for example, both the League of Women Voters and Women’s Alternatives for New Directions encourage dissent and debate among their members as a means of producing better ways of addressing social issues. These organizations use their structure as a means of sustaining “vigorous dialogic community” and creating a “critical pool of civic energy” capable of reinvigorating and repoliticizing issues and questions which remain troubling and inadequately resolved. WIIS currently boasts a membership of just over 1100 and its 2002-2005 Executive Board represents broad cross-sections of influential institutions, technical areas, policy orientations, and geographic areas. As such, WIIS enjoys an unparalleled ability to facilitate difficult conversations among women on matters of foreign affairs, substantive enough to change the conventions through which these affairs are generally understood.
II. WHAT IS WIIS?

Like many women’s organizations, Women in International Security began as a conversation among friends, in this case friends who were acquainted because they shared expertise in a region (Europe) and in a technical area (disarmament).\(^7\) In 1987, when the idea of WIIS began to gel in their minds, they also shared an eagerness to consolidate a nascent policy victory into personal advancement, to turn the tide toward nuclear disarmament into a narrative of upward mobility. In telling their story, WIIS materials state that in the mid-eighties, “women were beginning to have a noticeable presence in international security and related fields. But [the WIIS founders] realized that a formal organization dedicated to promoting women’s influence was urgently needed to make significant progress.”\(^8\) Indeed, women’s influence on international security and related fields was noticeable, in particular in the wake of the Nuclear Freeze campaign, which brought several new female leaders to national prominence, and in light of the 1985 Nairobi Conference’s Forward Looking Strategies, which identified equality between men and women as the cornerstone of sustainable peace. As hope for “world peace,” and the expectations of a soon to be realized “peace dividend” ran high, new women’s organizations, such as Women’s Alternatives for New Directions (1982) and the Women’s Foreign Policy Group (1981), were formed to sustain dialogue on these public policy issues. But WIIS founders did not want to put their energies into strengthening these other organizations. Instead, they chose to form a new organization to offer support to women like themselves, as they built their careers inside the structures of defense and foreign policy. In other words, the initial members of WIIS defined themselves as differing, in important ways, from both other women pursuing interests in international relations and from men pursuing careers in defense and foreign policy. In what follows, however, I will argue that WIIS has enacted, through its organizational choices and behaviors, a continual drift toward sameness that undermines this initial assertion of a positive difference as well as WIIS’s stated purpose of creating a security sector capacious enough to include an equal representation of women professionals in its ranks.

In introducing WIIS, I have been talking as if an organization comprised of many individuals were a coherent—if aggregate—subject, or a “rational actor,” in the sense that political scientists use that term. To some extent it is that, but more importantly for our purposes here, it is also a framework of informal and formal processes through which energy, people, and resources—the raw materials of power—flow. As a structure, WIIS is much less streamlined than its relatively small size would suggest, in part because it tries to accommodate dual impulses toward hierarchy and toward inclusion while remaining dependent upon the goodwill and voluntary contributions of individuals.

WIIS has employed staff almost since its inception, although in reality, its staff are employees of its host institution, Georgetown University, which also serves as the organization’s fiscal agent.\(^9\) The staff consists of an Executive Director, who reports, within Georgetown, to the Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies. Because the Executive Director is on the Georgetown payroll, it is she who must be formally listed as the principal investigator on any grants the organization secures. In addition to the Executive Director, WIIS has three full-time employees who report to her. WIIS also contracts some projects out to consultants or limited-term project staff, and typically hosts one or two student interns each semester. Although staff work closely
with board members and volunteers in carrying out their duties, their job performance is evaluated by the Executive Director.

WIIS is governed by a twenty-five member Executive Board that meets four times a year, and between these meetings the officers convene monthly as the Executive Council to act on urgent business. Because WIIS is not incorporated, the Executive Board is not a board of directors; it is not legally responsible for its decisions nor does it bear fiduciary responsibility. The power it holds, it holds by virtue of a memorandum of understanding between itself and Georgetown University. Board members serve concurrent three year terms, and the outgoing board “elects” the next board from a slate of candidates selected by the nominating committee.

A few years ago, WIIS formed an Advisory Board in hopes of retaining the involvement of retiring Executive Board members and of gaining the involvement of senior women who had no real need for the professional development services the organization offers but who might have much to offer younger women coming into and up in the field. Realizing that these women might not be able to devote the amount of time expected of Board members, the new advisory positions were devised. The Advisory Board, which numbers 35, presumably has a role in making decisions but no responsibility for stewardship. Some members of the Advisory Board, as well as some members of the Executive Board, play important roles in staffing committees, which direct staff members’ activities. For example, there is an events committee to provide direction and leadership in developing the content of the organization’s events, which the events coordinator is then expected to pull together logistically.

WIIS began offering memberships rather unpremeditatedly in 1991, and initially members were recruited solely through word of mouth on the part of the Executive Board. Later, as the organization began to depend on membership dues as a steady source of income, memberships were more aggressively marketed, primarily through e-mail. Membership grew from about 350 in 1996 to nearly 1200 in 2000 and has stabilized at just over 1100. Unless members are already friends or co-workers of Board members, they are more likely to have contact with the staff. The organization prides itself on providing a high level of service to its members, who are considered to be customers. WIIS holds no membership meetings, nor does the membership-at-large play any role in electing the Executive Board.

There is also the inevitable shadow organization that provides the informal backdrop against which WIIS decision-making takes place. This includes some Executive Board members, some Advisory Board members, some members, some influential people in the field whom the others wish were members but aren’t, and possibly, depending on circumstances, the Executive Director. This social network is the legacy of the initial friendship circle that founded WIIS, and it is this network that indirectly sets the expectations of what the organization ought to be doing.

Tactically, WIIS aims to position its members as insiders to the processes of foreign and defense policy formation and implementation in order to push through the glass ceiling of an employment sector structured around sexist assumptions. The organization regularly sponsors three sets of activities designed to address the needs of women at different stages of their careers: one set of activities focuses on recruiting college-age women into the field; another provides professional development opportunities, networking, and mentoring to young female
professionals; and a third aims to promote the accomplishments of established women through WIIS’s media guide and issue forums and by assisting in the appointments processes following presidential elections. Through its programming, WIIS facilitates the success of individuals. In its issue forums, WIIS members, as individuals, offer analysis and take positions on controversial topics of foreign policy, but the organization does not, even though policy decisions shape the field, and thus the opportunity structures, in which its members play out their professional careers. While WIIS has not taken positions on potentially controversial policy initiatives that might further gender equity in the workplaces of its members, the organization nevertheless benefits from sexual discrimination lawsuits that spark changes in recruiting or promotion practices as well as from developments within the UN community that legitimate broader international concerns as impacting national security.

Like so many women’s organizations that flourished in the afterglow of the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, WIIS suffered setbacks with the U.S. presidential elections of 2000. That year, WIIS spent considerable staff time and money hosting a series of professional development events aimed at helping women position themselves for appointment in the new administration.

The following year (2001), WIIS began to plan for moving its administrative offices out of the University of Maryland to some other institution more centrally located within the national capital area. The move to Georgetown University was disruptive, but WIIS continued to organize and host a multitude of programs, responding to the kinds of questions and concerns that all of us had following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It continued to issue its routine membership directory and media guide. In the Winter of 2001-2, the Membership Coordinator left. No sooner was she replaced than the Executive Director resigned. A national search was conducted and a new Executive Director was hired in October 2002, after the position had been vacant for several months. In January 2003, both the Membership and Events Coordinators left. Then, in March 2003, the Special Projects Coordinator left on extended medical leave. Her departure was followed within days by the resignation of the Executive Director, who had just come on board the previous Fall.

These transitions have taken a toll on WIIS’s ability to carry out its program of work. WIIS’s annual publications—its membership directory and media guide—have now been delayed for a second time. Programming for Fall 2002 was almost non-existent, and the slate of events scheduled for Spring 2003 consisted primarily (at the writing of this paper) of forums co-sponsored with its institutional host, the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown; the Spring job fair, postponed once due to weather, drew about 200 fewer attendees than the nearly 500 who attended in 2002; the total number of WIIS-sponsored events for 2002-03 fell several dozen short of the 40 the organization claims to hold annually.

Yet the organization continues to attract support and will soon launch a major new programming initiative with funding from the MacArthur Foundation. Nor are the difficulties the organization has been experiencing reflective of the state of its members’ careers. Members with an area emphasis in the Middle East or a topical specialty in terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, or Islam report being in continuous high demand for community forums, teach-ins, media commentary, radio call-in shows, etc. Women are visible everywhere as our country sustains a
prolonged and vigorous debate on international relations, the role of the United States in the world, the contents of our arsenal, and the conditions of just war. There are prominent women at the State Department, women in the Army, women as heads of humanitarian aid organizations, women in Congress, women experts everywhere. Are the challenges facing WIIS just growing pains? Are they indicative of some deeper changes in the fields of foreign, defense, and security policy WIIS ostensibly serves? How can WIIS respond organizationally to these challenges in ways that are informed by and consistent with the reforms it seeks in the field of international security policy?
III. IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE SECURITY SECTOR

During the administrative transitions following the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections, WIIS developed considerable expertise in putting forward viable candidates to fill appointed positions. WIIS’s fall 2000 newsletter included a special insert inviting members to submit their resumes to the organization’s presidential appointment initiative and reporting on its recent forum, “A thinking woman’s guide to understanding the political appointments process.” While most of the advice contained in this insert is gender-neutral, having to do with how the hiring process is carried out, Jan Piercy, former Deputy Assistant to President Clinton and at that time US Executive Director of the World Bank, did offer some insights especially geared toward women. “Women, unlike men, seldom systematically exploit the contributions they have made or their contacts,” Piercy said, and, going on to talk of strategies for countering “the old boys network,” she recommended exploiting gender stereotypes as well, stating, “Women are thought to possess a lot of energy and extreme loyalty, and to not have a huge personal agenda of their own. All of those are positive attributes in a political appointee.”

Most of the governmental bodies dealing in foreign, security, and defense policy are staffed by a combination of political appointees and “pipeline”, or civil service, personnel, and there is typically some distrust or even hostility between the two employee groups (McGlen and Sarkees, 1993). As the fall dragged on with the election results still hanging in the balance, WIIS covered its bases by preparing binders bursting with qualified women’s resumes suitable for either outcome, Republican or Democrat, and after the decision to award the presidency to George W. Bush, the Executive Board moved quickly to identify the key contacts on the transition team and move the binders into the “right” hands. Gale Mattox, outgoing president of WIIS, believes that between 4 and 6 of the women put forward by WIIS were eventually granted interviews for positions in the Bush administration but admits that Republican women remain a minority on the organization’s Executive Board, constituting perhaps 20% of its 25 members.

We know that all sorts of differences can serve to create (and entrench) social inequality, although it is not always clear which differences are producing which result. Also unclear are the points at which differences among social groups become, through intersectionality at the level of the individual, idiosyncrasies that in turn may be interpreted as “merit”. Every rule demands its exception, every truth requires its critic, and every profession accommodates a few outliers, or tokens. The example above, describing WIIS’s attempts to influence the presidential appointments process, suggests that political affiliation is one of the axes of difference that bisects WIIS’s membership in ways that matter. We can safely infer that there are other differences—certainly in class of origin and in sexual preference—operating as well.

Nevertheless, WIIS does not have any “identity”-based task forces or caucuses through which the concerns of various interest groups (for example lesbians or Latinas or working-class women) might gain salience. At the same time, WIIS’s membership is rife with women “firsts”, including most notably Madeleine Albright, the first woman appointed U.S. Secretary of State. In her history of the women’s movement in the U.S., Ruth Rosen observes that the “first woman” stories popularized in the daily newspapers during the years 1972-76 followed a predictable formula:
Invariably, the reporter asked the first woman whether she considered herself a “libber”, whether feminism had helped her secure her new position, and if she had encountered resentment from male coworkers or subordinates. The first women learned the right answers to these questions: No, being a woman had never harmed them, nor had it helped them. No, they had no connection with “women’s libbers”… When asked whether men had expressed any hostility to [women’s] arrival in the workplace, they diplomatically described themselves as “good sports” and “one of the guys” (Rosen, 2000: 303).

But, as Rosen points out, the “first women” accounts of the 1970s consistently excluded any mention of affirmative action as providing the context for these individual breakthroughs, even though middle-class, educated, white women were best positioned to claim the new employment opportunities opened up by President Johnson’s Executive Order 11375, as amended in 1967 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex (Rosen, 2000: 304). Thus, these stories reflected an ethos of meritocracy rather than equity, and left a confused legacy of misunderstanding, denial, and sometimes guilt in their wake.

When I asked WIIS leadership about diversity within the organization, the question was usually understood to be one about racial representation, and the consensus opinion was that WIIS has fallen short of achieving an optimum level of racial integration. Although the organization has not set any specific diversity targets, it has struggled to track and improve its record of racial diversity, and recently commissioned an internal report on its diversity-building efforts.

**Figure 1: WIIS Diversity Profile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WIIS</th>
<th>Caucasian</th>
<th>African-American</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Asian-Pacific</th>
<th>Native American</th>
<th>Mix/Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94% Women</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6% Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Board</td>
<td>21 (84%)</td>
<td>3 (12%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 25 members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory Board</td>
<td>31 (88.5%)</td>
<td>3 (8.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 35 members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>4 (58%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>2 (28%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 7 (3 interns)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The figures shown in the WIIS diversity profile (above) are taken from an internally-prepared report issued in 2000. The membership data was gathered through a survey distributed to 1000 individuals with a 25% response rate. Accompanying text from the report reads: “Over the past three years our minority staff has ranged from 20 percent to its current 43 percent (including
Interns), and the number of minority Executive Board officers has reached as high as two-thirds. WIIS’ Executive and Advisory Boards currently comprise 16 percent and 12 percent minorities, respectively. “Although these figures are somewhat better than the record of representation in the professions from which WIIS membership is drawn, WIIS has sought to improve its performance by establishing partnerships with historically Black colleges and universities and by developing affiliate organizations in foreign countries.

Although WIIS has occasionally co-sponsored events with the Women’s Foreign Policy Group and with Women Waging Peace, these short term partnerships seem to be born of opportunity and convenience rather than the result of deliberative or strategic choice. WIIS does not participate in women’s leadership conferences such as those sponsored by the Feminist Majority Foundation or the American Association of University Women, nor does it ally itself with groups—like Women’s Alternatives for New Directions or the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice—that are trying to change the terms and institutions of the security equation. Deeper collaboration with other women’s membership organizations might expose WIIS leaders and staff to alternative ways of operating and to other organizational cultures, and perhaps lead WIIS to make beneficial revisions in its work practices.

Although many perceive WIIS’s strategy for “increasing the influence of women in foreign and defense policy” to be quite sophisticated, its leaders would like to find a way to measure the organization’s effectiveness. Uncertainty about what data should drive its decisions and the absence of recognized channels for filtering the wisdom of its membership “up” the organization are affecting the ability of WIIS’s leadership to make informed decisions about programming and staff. Viewing WIIS within the context of other women’s organizations concerned with affecting security and defense policy might help WIIS better understand both the range of project and programming options possible for itself as an organization and the practical limitations of the unique niche WIIS fills.
IV. SISTERHOOD AND SOLIDARITY

WIIS is still operating on the basis of friendship, specifically on friendships cemented around a shared set of obstacles to professional advancement. These obstacles—sexual harassment in the workplace, gender erasure in the expert knowledges structuring the workplace, intense performance standards that demand maximum face-time and erodes even the most conscious attempts at constructing a balanced life, career tracks structured in ways that defy the human life cycle and ignore community responsibilities—form the basis for bonding across ideological and partisan lines. However, as the context in which women pursue careers in foreign affairs changes, the use of friendship as a basis for building the organization can itself become a barrier for new members who may already have a satisfying circle of personal relationships or to those who already feel fully embedded in a culture that satisfies their needs or conflicts with the dominant narrative of WIIS. Such new recruits may decide to relate to the organization instrumentally, paying dues and accepting “benefits” while distancing themselves personally from the “personalities” or “internal politics” of the organization and consciously muting their distinctive personalities and differences in their dealings with WIIS.

Ella Bell and Stella Nkomo provide some insight into how WIIS’s mechanisms of creating a safe insider space might serve to produce exclusion as well. In their book *Our Separate Ways: Black and White Women and the Struggle for Professional Identity* (2001), Bell and Nkomo throw into stark relief some of the subjective values typical of white managerial and professional women. They find, among other things, that the narratives of white women who have traveled via their professional careers up the class ladder tend to have a high degree of belief that individual hard work and merit will overcome obstacles. More frequently than women of color, these women have in fact had to go it alone, without the material or emotional support of kin or community. More frequently than women of color, they deny that their success was in any way predicated on the social movements, such as civil rights or feminism, which were part of the social context or backdrop for their narrative of personal success. Connected to this is Bell’s and Nkomo’s finding that “the white women as a group were relatively less vocal about injustices. Even though they encountered exclusionary practices and often hostile corporate environments because of their gender, they seemed to believe they could fit in by doing the right things” (p. 131). “White women,” they write, “stressed the importance of learning to play by the rules and adjusting to well-entrenched performance requirements. . . They also stressed the importance of aligning their language and behavior with that of male peers” (p. 171).

While the subjective perspectives of white women may be typical among women professionals, as that group is currently constituted, theirs are not the only set of attitudes possible or available. In contrast, the black women professionals interviewed by Bell and Nkomo tell tales of community support, both emotional and material, extending far from their immediate familial circle and expanding the resource base available for them to draw on in financing college and working connections to open opportunities. The combination of emotional and often material extra-familial support and a sense of connectedness to the civil rights movement suggest a formula for how women bettering themselves through their careers might maintain a sense of political purpose in doing so.
Indeed, the black women interviewed by Bell and Nkomo speak of their contributions of time, talents, and money to community groups, cultural institutions, and charitable associations as ways of sharing in a collective identity or participating in a shared cause. Whereas many white women professionals saw themselves as unique—even rugged—individuals, most black women professionals interviewed by Bell and Nkomo insisted on viewing themselves as part of a larger community, as embedded in a social fabric, with a moral responsibility to help raise the prospects of the entire community or challenge an oppressive social system. White managerial and professional women, on the other hand, viewed their volunteer commitments as a “civic duty” or “extracurricular activity.”

The racial differences in attitude identified by Bell and Nkomo became quite apparent in the interviews I conducted with alumni of WIIS’s summer institute, in as much as only the women of color described their work as having a social purpose, only women of color addressed the wider ethical issues around security policy in reference to their own research, and only women of color spoke of their involvement with public schools, churches, and community organizations. By contrast, the white women alumnae with whom I spoke pegged their ambitions only to the next rung level of the institutional hierarchy in which they worked, and, when asked about their other group affiliations, listed only narrowly focused professional associations.

The new WIIS members of color with whom I spoke seemed to be struggling to bring their community affiliations and obligations to bear on their work as professionals, rather than viewing these commitments as baggage to be left behind or dealt with only off hours. For women seeking to more fully actualize the simultaneity of their identities, WIIS’s “assimilationist” approach to professional advancement might feed into already existing miscues and miscommunication among women from different races and class backgrounds, and be read as an invitation to “pass”. An invitation offered on such terms would quite likely discourage a high level of involvement or commitment to the organization on the part of women of color, or, for that matter, on the part of any woman who senses she is somehow different from the rest. More specifically, women who enter the fields of security or foreign policy with a strong philosophical or moral commitment or with commitment to a specific constituency or community of origin might feel put off by the self-storying of WIIS’s founders, which is a story of putting more and more energy into establishing a professional identity and removing barriers to professional advancement.

A career in international relations requires a certain freedom to travel and relocate globally, and the opportunity for such adventures is an important incentive pulling women into these allied professions. Therefore, it is quite unremarkable that the stories WIIS members tell, particularly to young women, are unified in their devaluing of the domestic, the local, of home. In this sense, and in others, inclusion comes to depend on exclusion. About such dynamics, bell hooks has observed, “Bonding between a chosen circle of women who strengthen their ties by excluding and devaluing women outside their group closely resembles the type of personal bonding between women that has always occurred under patriarchy” (hooks, 1984: 46). This model of “sisterhood”, which rests on the assumption of a common identity, offers emotional support but delays the need to acknowledge differences among women and hides “the fact that many women exploit and oppress other women” (hooks, 1984: 44). It also postpones, perhaps indefinitely, the
work necessary to build relationships of solidarity with women who are, in meaningful ways, different from those inside the initial circle.

Because WIIS is a voluntary membership organization, the stakes for neglecting relationships or letting them lie dormant are low and the potential for doing so high. Because there are no elections, no by-laws, and no true fiduciary responsibility, consecutive meetings of the Executive Board can be missed without drawing much comment; one can literally just walk away from the organization. Interpersonal stresses along race or class lines can yield effects that can easily be ignored or rationalized on other grounds. On the other hand, in the day-to-day functioning of the organization, conflicts over substantive policy issues don’t need to be addressed at all.

Nevertheless, they ought to be. Although WIIS has never described itself as a “think tank” nor set itself the task of formulating new policy approaches, it holds within its membership rolls human resources capable of producing much needed policy alternatives and unorthodox perspectives. In order to access this potential, WIIS could make use of its organizational structure to encourage both the exchange of relevant information and intellectual engagement among its members. It also could use its institutional stability to “hold” and affirm members as they embrace the difficulties of working across difference. One simple step toward doing this would be to strongly encourage the full participation of all Executive Board members by subsidizing travel and lodging expenses for out-of-town members or by offering other incentives to encourage attendance at meetings. Such incentives, however, can never substitute for well-chaired meetings, utilizing norms and procedures that encourage attentive listening, guarantee every participant an adequate amount of floor time, and structure fair deliberations and decision-making.20

The key to success in any employment sector is often having contacts, and providing its members with contacts is one of WIIS’s most deeply embedded organizational practices. Furthermore, WIIS devotes a considerable portion of its resources to strengthening the pipeline: for example, each year it runs a summer institute for female graduate students and each spring it hosts a well-attended job fair. These efforts lead WIIS leaders to foreground values of inclusivity and accessibility when they speak of the organization and the organization’s struggles to keep membership dues low and, more recently, to develop a campus network for recruitment. In these ways, WIIS expresses a commitment to building community among women, despite the professional commitments individual WIIS members have made to sustaining hierarchical chains of status and command. A resilient community rests upon bonds of solidarity—the conscious acceptance of and respect for difference—rather than upon sisterhood, the projection of an assumed and often imaginary similarity.

By focusing almost entirely on professional development and recruitment of younger women, WIIS has found a way to bring women together around issues of security and defense across lines of ideology and party affiliation. It has a substantial, if largely uninvolved, membership and has developed capabilities that no other women’s organization has. Clearly WIIS has much to bring to the table of a shared coalition agenda. But as it currently exists, WIIS is poorly prepared to work in alliance with other women’s organizations that also want to increase women’s influence on U.S. foreign and defense policy, albeit for reasons very different than short-term individual professional gain. Nonetheless, there is evidence, in the documentary record of the
past two years and in the emerging constructivist and post-colonial strands of international relations theory, which I will discuss below, to suggest that WIIS should learn to work in alliance with these other women’s organizations if it wants to remain true to its own vision of bringing increasing numbers of young women into the field. The alternative of leaving current policies and institutions unchallenged and intact will very likely result in a situation where these young women of the future will face a much diminished array of opportunities for professional involvement and leadership. /n
V. SOVEREIGNTY AND SUBSIDIARITY

The years of WIIS’s existence have coincided with a creeping upward trend in the numbers of women holding senior positions within the institutions traditionally influential in devising foreign policy. However, some of these institutions, such as the Department of State, where women now make up slightly over 27% of employees at grade G-15 or higher, have lost standing relative to other institutions, such as the Department of Defense, where women are represented at about half that level. At the same time, new institutions, such as the Project for a New American Century (authors of the highly influential position paper *Rebuilding America’s Defenses*) have gained prominence. These institutions are more likely to employ women at token levels, and the women they employ tend to be either related to the men by blood or marriage, or protégés nurtured through specific ideological mechanisms, such as The Bradley Foundation, rather than through a women’s professional network, such as that run by WIIS.22

Sovereignty, a concept that has become increasingly contested in the context of globalized interdependency, is once more a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Sovereignty is invoked to justify the exercise of unfettered dominion over people and resources located within national borders by government agencies and to champion the pursuit of national and commercial interests abroad through the use or threat of military force. The scope of national interests being secured, however, may represent the interests of a relatively small number of U.S. residents, for “it is clear that consolidation of economic power in fewer and fewer hands remains a key strategic approach of the [Bush] administration” (Bennis, 2003). It seems unlikely that, in the long view, increasing border patrols and centralized decision-making in the hands of a small clique of associates will win the day, and WIIS should not emulate practices that are clearly retrograde and not in the best interests of women, per se.

Rather, practices of subsidiarity—which decentralize public policy decision-making to the smallest feasible social unit—are being increasingly embraced in international venues such as the World Social Forum, in part because they are seen as more congruent with goals of gender equity and participatory democracy. The most effective international women’s NGOs today can be understood as operating according to principles of subsidiarity, intended to facilitate the transfer of problem solving know-how from the local level to the international level.

The Center for Gender in Organizations has developed a rubric for describing organizational approaches to improving gender equity. It uses the language of frames to differentiate various organizational approaches (Ely and Meyerson, 2000).
Figure 2: Frames.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Definition of gender</th>
<th>Addressing inequity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frame 1. Fix the women</td>
<td>Gender is an individual characteristic marked by one’s biological category as male or female. Sex-role socialization produces individual differences in attitudes and behaviors which have rendered women less skilled than men.</td>
<td>Eliminate the differences. Educate and train more women for business and professional careers to ease recruitment and enhance the applicant pool. Provide executive training, leadership development, networking opportunities, and assertiveness training to women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame 2. Value the feminine</td>
<td>Gender is an individual characteristic marked by one’s biological category as male or female. Sex-role socialization produces individual differences in attitudes and behaviors which have rendered women less skilled than men.</td>
<td>Celebrate the differences. Consciousness-raising and training for both men and women to raise awareness of how feminine traits are devalued and to point out the contribution these traits can make to the workplace and to improved business outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame 3. Create equal opportunities</td>
<td>Gender is an individual characteristic marked by one’s biological category as male or female. Sex-role socialization results in differential structures of opportunity and power that block women’s access and advancement.</td>
<td>Policy-based initiatives that revise recruitment processes (affirmative action), institution of formal mentoring programs, clarifying and/or publicizing promotion policies, constructing a range of career path possibilities, flexible work arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame 4. Assess and revise work culture</td>
<td>Gender is the set of social relations through which the categories of male and female, masculine and feminine, derive meaning and shape experience.</td>
<td>Ongoing interventions that continuously identify and disrupt the social order and revise the structural, interactive, and interpretive practices in organizations. Works at level of organizational structure and culture.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Although this rubric was developed to describe interventions taken within a single workplace or corporation, the various frames identified can also be used to distinguish among the approaches adopted by women’s membership organizations that promote women’s advancement across an entire profession. An organization determined to challenge the institutional context and philosophical assumptions determining the scope of legitimate practice might tend to experiment with some combination of Frame 2 (“value the feminine”) and Frame 4 (“assess and revise the work culture”) interventions, as such organizations would need, in some way, to conceptualize a positive alternative while seeking to destabilize the assumptions conditioning the carrying out of “business as usual.” Within the arena of foreign and defense policy, celebratory and destabilizing practices have been adopted and continually revised by women’s peace organizations, which often make use of “masquerade” and dramatization to economically communicate complex critiques and agendas. At the same time, women’s groups operating within departments of the federal government, such as the Alliance for National Defense, serve as internal watchdogs documenting and publicizing steps toward equity in hiring and promotions and increasing the transparency with and accountability under which these agencies operate. Their activities might be best understood as Frame 3 (“create equal opportunities”) interventions as they work to consolidate legal reforms through policy implementation. WIIS, on the other hand, targets most of its activities toward its members as individuals and concentrates on “fixing the women.” The prototype to which ambitious women are trained by WIIS to conform was, at least initially, white, U.S.-born men, who in the defense and security sectors sit as firmly at the top of the
power pyramid as in any other. As a few women gain footholds in an unreformed pyramid, these “women leaders” gradually come to replace the initial masculine prototype as the models for emulation.

Activities aimed at remediation are, at their heart, assimilationist and tend to produce group homogeneity rather than diversity. This happens both because trainees are being molded into a singular standard and also because programming devised to produce this transformation in individuals tends to be “predicated solely on an understanding of the needs of white women in the managerial and professional ranks, as if those needs coincided with the needs of all women in the organization” (Ely and Myerson, 2000). According to Stacy Blake-Beard, a one-size-fits-all program leaves “other women to fend for themselves and places additional stresses on race and class relations in organizations, especially among women” (Blake, 1999).

While interviews with alumnae of the WIIS summer institute suggest that many new members are attracted by the opportunity WIIS seems to offer to build lateral relations among their peers, they soon find that the highly centralized structure of the organization limits the potential for doing just that. With the exception of its invitational conferences and reception at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, nearly all WIIS events take place in Washington, D.C. Of those responding to the 1999 member survey, 70% gave geographic vicinity as the primary reason for not attending WIIS events. While WIIS has co-sponsored events in Washington, D.C. with other organizations in the past, it hasn’t yet come up with a way to sponsor events outside the capital in those areas where significant pockets of members live. This barrier could be overcome with some ingenuity, for example by offering mini-grants to underwrite the expenses incurred by members who would like to organize a WIIS event and perhaps providing support from the office for mailing invitations or broadcasting information through the organization’s members e-mail list. Requests generated through such a mini-grant system would inform the board about the issue areas and topics of interest to WIIS membership; in turn, the events themselves would likely increase awareness of the organization and generate new memberships. With some ingenuity, WIIS could craft a mechanism that would retain some centralized oversight of its programming while dispersing the authority to initiate projects more broadly among the organization’s far-flung membership. Doing so could invest the identity of the organization more profoundly in the organization’s members while permitting members to invest more of their talents and time in strengthening the organization.
VI. CUSTOMER SERVICE OR DIALOGIC COMMUNITY

As WIIS ages as an organization, the founders are increasingly finding themselves doing double duty as both the managers of the organization and as the role models for newcomers to the field. Some Executive Board members I interviewed reported feeling both overtaxed and ineffectual. There has been some talk of—but little initiative shown toward—developing processes for transitioning power within the organization to new leadership or of diffusing power more equally throughout the organization. I want to suggest that one way of facilitating such transitions would be to reimagine the nature of the work the organization does as “creating dialogic community.”

WIIS sees itself as providing information, events, and opportunities to its members. In return, it asks members for nothing more than a nominal annual fee. The fee goes into the budget, which the board allocates to produce the information, events, and opportunities that the staff dispense. Because there are no formal feedback mechanisms for assessing member satisfaction or for allowing members to participate in shaping the organization’s direction or activities, WIIS’s agenda is very vulnerable to being driven by the needs and priorities of its donors rather than those of its membership.

There are no clear pathways for developing new leadership, such as local chapters or interest caucuses, and the at-large membership does not convene as a whole for an annual meeting or conference. Thus, responsibility for generating program ideas and content, as well as for strategic planning, comes to rest on the shoulders of a relatively small subset of WIIS membership, the Executive Board. The responsibility of the Executive Board is further magnified by the distinctions made between duties of paid staff and volunteers. In committee work, the work of initiating is the province of the volunteers, who are held to be the “experts” in the field. While the Executive Board members are, in almost all cases, expert at their professions, WIIS staff are more likely to have direct contact with greater numbers of the organization’s membership at large. This is true because WIIS staff handle the day-to-day business of processing membership applications and event registrations, and field members’ questions. In this sense, WIIS staff could be expected to develop an expert knowledge of members’ interests and needs. In the current organizational structure, however, staff members’ expertise has no practical outlet. The staff is expected to respond to the directives of board and committee members, rather than initiate programs or events. They are given very limited creative scope and decision-making power, nor are these dimensions on which their job performance is measured. Thus, the knowledge they accumulate often fails to diffuse throughout the organization and rarely affects the organization’s program of work.

Inasmuch as the know-how generated through human interaction and shared work has no clear path for traveling up the decision-making ladder within WIIS, WIIS’s organizational practices model in uncanny miniature the dystopic dynamics inhibiting innovation and transformation within the security and defense sectors of the U.S. political economy more generally, in which, too often, allegiance to an ideal of strength in unity, hierarchy, and centralization mitigates against taking either popular opinion or grassroots techniques of peace-building seriously.
Earlier studies documenting a “gender gap” in the willingness to use military force to resolve international conflicts has spawned a second wave of empirical studies linking specific attitudes and values, usually associated with women, to pacific foreign policy preferences. Some of the “value” differences that have been shown to be more prevalent among women than men in the contemporary U.S., and which have been linked to non-belligerence in foreign policy, include a tendency to minimize power difference, to share resources, and to treat others equally (Caprioli, 2000). Some political scientists are now arguing that the diffusion of these preferences throughout society, signaled by a high level of gender equality within a society as a whole, measurably decreases a nation’s willingness to engage in war (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001), or that men and women supportive of equality between men and women are also more favorably disposed toward diplomacy and compromise (Tessler, Natchwey, and Grant, 1999).

This line of argument connects individual belief in women’s equality to a realization of women’s equality in a society to foreign policy outcomes through the prism of democratic decision-making, whereby the preferences and beliefs of individuals can become manifest in public policy. In other words, the individuals surveyed must have some means of expressing themselves as civil subjects in order for their ideals to take material shape in the world. But, as perhaps goes too often unremarked within the context of the United States, democracy requires particular behaviors, possibly even more than normative attitudes. How do we learn to behave as civil subjects? Where do we get to practice the behaviors essential to democratic decision-making?

The notion that feminists act collectively for the benefit of all women, rather than individually for the benefit of themselves, is rooted less in idealism than in an analysis of power. Like other disenfranchised communities, feminists have long theorized the existence of an alternative mode of power in the world. Patriarchal power is “power over,” organized hierarchically, reliant in the last instance on the mobilization of physical force that sucks the life out of others and out of the earth itself, so that a few, ultimately “the one,” can thrive. An alternative vision of power can be found in the notion of human security, which “seeks to place the individual—or people collectively—as the referent of security, rather than, although not necessarily in opposition to, institutions such as territory and state sovereignty” (Newman, 2001). “Human security [addresses] how human beings can find security around the basic day-to-day activities they perform to create a peaceful and prosperous life for themselves” and “human rights … provides the ground, the base, from which human security stems” (Women’s Learning Partnership, 2002).

The notion that extending rights might best ensure the security of individuals evokes individuals as civil beings, or agenic citizens, rather than as potential victims in need of protection. Human security, as “human rights writ large,” requires that citizens “tap into the vital national democracy and realize its potential to create an environment in which we can advance the agenda of human security concerns” (Women’s Learning Partnership, 2002), and that societies evolve a “mode of engagement that increases and enables citizens’ ability to participate in decision-making wherever they are located” that goes “beyond electoral participation” (Bhattacharjee, 2003). Within the human security paradigm, then, power is divisible and infinite (Caprioli, 2000), constructive as well as potentially destructive, located in unexpected spaces as well as in arsenals.
When, in the early eighties, Helen Caldicott and Randall Forsberg called upon the rhetorical legacy of Women Strike for Peace to translate the abstract threat of nuclear annihilation into human terms (that is, as a menace to public health rather than a strategy for national defense), they encouraged new voices to enter into debates about foreign policy objectives. In redefining security as inclusive of environmental threats, Jessica Tuchman Mathews created legitimate space for new vocabulary and new concepts to join in the conversation. The grassroots education campaign to ban the use of landmines, for which Jody Williams would later win the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, appealed to civilian populations, including children, as stakeholders invested in the relationships among states and in the evolution of international law. The authority of the human security paradigm was consolidated in the United Nations Human Development Report of 1994, which expanded upon the lessons learned studying the uneven effects of rising GDP on impoverished populations, to state that “human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human dignity.”

The prominence of women’s leadership in developing what has become known as the human security paradigm should not be elided or forgotten, even by women who are critical of that paradigm. These women, more so than Jeanne Kilpatrick or Margaret Thatcher, offered by example an explicit invitation to women to involve themselves in foreign affairs, an invitation accepted by the thousands who gathered at Nairobi in 1985 and later in Beijing to participate in imagining the theory and articulating the mechanisms by which women’s concerns, and the dynamics of gender, might be mainstreamed into international policies and institutions. Many WIIS members have been deeply involved in this transformation and many WIIS programs have contributed to developing practice in this area. Better documentation of event proceedings and a more robust publications program would quicken the institutionalization and consolidation of these breakthroughs, and over time allow a perspective, indigenous and unique to WIIS as an organization, to emerge.

While it may be true that institutions dominated by male leadership and organized to sustain such tend to “erase” the womanliness of individuals processed through their hierarchies, it does not follow that women’s voluntary organizations cannot or should not consciously seek to preserve and reinforce those traits, which in particular cultural contexts have been marked as “feminine” and which have been noted to foster democratic practice and non-violent conflict management. In fact, it might be the case that such women’s organizations are, in fact, the most appropriate laboratories for developing and extending those capacities.
VII. CONCLUSION: TIMELINESS MATTERS

As a brief review of its development demonstrates, WIIS is a lively organization that is innovating just as fast as its leadership can make and implement decisions. The difficulty is not that the organization is resistant to change, but rather that it undertakes changes without a clear strategy for achieving its mission—in other words, it lacks an adequate theory of its own organizational practice. By placing my observations about WIIS within larger contexts, I have told a story that invests the organization, rather than key individuals, with agency, purpose, and meaning. As such, it suggests values-based criteria (of solidarity, subsidiarity, and dialogic community) drawn from the global women’s movement, on which decisions shaping the organization’s future might be based. But the story I’ve chosen to tell is just one of the stories that could be told about WIIS to give definition to its amorphous mission of “increasing the role of women in foreign and defense affairs.”

As a result of observing WIIS through the transitions of the past year and talking with members and leaders of the organization, I have generated some ideas for decentralizing power within the organization and for bringing new voices and perspectives into the organization’s decision-making process. These are:

- Develop recognized channels for funneling member input into Executive Board decision-making;
- Strive to increase participation in Executive Board meetings by subsidizing travel expenses for out-of-town members;
- Share program initiation power with members through a mini-grant program;
- Establish a personnel committee to decompress relationship between Executive Director and President;
- Seek to develop strategic alliances with women’s membership organizations having overlapping or adjacent constituencies.

The changes I’ve outlined above could be understood as steps toward “democratizing” the organization. Should WIIS decide to adopt all of the measures suggested here, the combined impact on its operating budget might be between $12,000 and $15,000 annually, with allocated monies going primarily for board travel expenses and for the mini-grant program. On the other hand, enhancing WIIS’s program archives and communications programs could require substantial investment.27

Within the academic disciplines of international relations and women’s studies, a significant amount of recent work has focused on elucidating “gender” as a process or verb. Persons are forever gendered and re-gendered to fit into evolving social niches, and individuals “perform” gender in ways that subtly conform to but also contest the social fabric. In this post-structuralist rendering, gender is mutable, interactive, and interdependent with other dynamics, for example, aggression or greed. Thus, the available ways of being a woman are highly context-specific but always on the move. The new international context created by U.S. abandonment of international law and explicit embrace of military aggression has changed the opportunity structures within which “womanliness” might express itself as well as the lenses through which such
performances might be interpreted. The strategy of bringing women together across differences to accomplish limited goals has been used to restore respect and stop the killing over the abortion issue in the U.S. and to initiate dialogue and build leadership among women from combatant sides in intrastate conflicts. Although the differences among WIIS members were never that acute, they may prove, at this historical juncture, to be just as consequential.

In this paper, I have relied to some extent on analogy to argue that the tensions of this historical moment are reflected in tensions within WIIS and perhaps to infer that those willing to take responsibility for stewarding WIIS in the future might transfer their insights as security professionals to their practice as members. Surely no one who studies the field of International Relations can have failed to notice the challenges raised over the past twenty years by the human security paradigm, by constructivists, by post-colonialists, and by feminists. In their own ways, each of these challenges have been about widening the scope of the discipline, about calling attention to phenomenon outside the constricted frame of cold war realpolitik. These currents of rethinking have swelled WIIS’s membership with experts and practitioners skilled in all sorts of specialties who have come to see their knowledges as relevant to international security. Today, as an organization, WIIS is poised to have a significant influence on the future of foreign policy if it can focus and develop the energies of its membership. Building on WIIS’s commitments to inclusivity and access, I have argued that the most philosophically consistent means of improving the effectiveness of the organization is to further democratize its decision-making practices and leadership succession policies. By providing its members with opportunities to actually do things with each other, WIIS will deepen the peer-to-peer, woman-to-woman relationships among WIIS members and gestate new circles of friendship and support similar to those its founders enjoyed.
ENDNOTES

1 Three out of five panelists contributing to a WIIS roundtable (June 7, 2003, at Georgetown University) on “Careers in International Security” explicitly noted the positive impact this dynamic had on their own career trajectories. (Audiotape on file with author.)

2 In addition, Pam Solo argues that the prolonged arms reduction talks of the Reagan/Bush I era, which took place in the context of a broadly popular movement for nuclear disarmament, opened up social space for the emergence of “citizen experts,” individuals deeply familiar with the technical dimensions of military hardware yet grounded in anti-war politics (Solo, 1998: 127). This hybrid identity offered an appealing option to women interested in effecting U.S. foreign policy, and many of these “citizen experts” were women. Women adopting this stance were to some extent able to deflect the “red-baiting” and sexual smears which historically have marred the attempts by U.S. women to exercise influence on international policy (Jeffreys-Jones, 1995: 3).

3 To understand how economic inequality plays out at the level of the individual, one might compare the salaries for various types of jobs advertised on the Foreign Policy Association website (www.fpa.org). Jobs with clearly benevolent outcomes, as opposed to those with instrumental outcomes, are frequently offered on a “volunteer” basis, or the respective career outlooks for young people choosing to enroll either in the Peace Corps or in the U.S. Military. Among human security theorists, there is a broad consensus that economic inequality and unequal access to material resources, more generally, between and within states poses the gravest—and growing—threat to security. See, for example, Thomas (159-60) and Newman (241).

4 Jane Holl Lute, guest on The Connection, produced by WBUR and originally airing on March 4, 2003. “Let’s say women are less disposed to resort to violence to settle their problems than men. OK? That’s true now. But the degree to which women are integrated into the institutions of governance, into the institutions of the military, I think something happens. And I noticed this at West Point, where I taught for a while. Yes, women change the institutions, but the institutions change the women. This is true for women in sports, for women in the military… I think we need to ask ourselves a more sensible set of questions… How does gender influence the decision-making processes that lead to $400 billion defense budgets and 200,000 troops idling off the coast of Kuwait?”

5 “The concept of simultaneity involves recognizing that identities are multiple and constructed in relation to others, as opposed to fixed, unitary, and essential” (Holvino and Sheridan, 2003).

6 Here I am making use of terminology crafted by Jasmina Husanovic (2001). Husanovic is drawing on the richly constructivist legacy of Eastern European and Russian linguists most accessible to Western audiences through the work of Mikhail Bakhtin.

7 Gray, Sherry. Interview with the author on March 7, 2003.


9 WIIS moved its base of operations from the Center for International and Security Studies, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, to the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, in August 2001.

10 Information on WIIS’s operations was gathered from interviews with five Executive Board members and five current and past staff members conducted between November 2002 and June 2003. While I had access to current and outdated WIIS membership materials and some internal reports, I did not have access to certain key documents of the organization: its Memorandum of Understanding with Georgetown, its by-laws, or its budgets.

12 The WIIS website lists all events held in calendar years 2001 and 2002. For each year there are the same number of events listed (21). It may be the case that the number “40” reflects the high expectations of my informants rather than any historical achievement.

13 Piercy’s remarks are quoted in WIIS Words, Special Insert, Fall 2000.

14 Gale Mattox in telephone conversation with author, January 26, 2003. Women across party lines were equally disappointed with the results of G.W. Bush’s appointment process, which resulted in about 25% of 495 cabinet and sub-cabinet positions being filled by women. This contrasts with 37% women appointees who served in the Clinton administration. See “Women’s appointments plummet under Bush” (7/1/01) and “Bush appointments include fewer women” (2/11/02), both by Marie Tessler for Women’s eNews, www.womensenews.org.

15 These sentiments were echoed by one WIIS Executive Board member who told me, “This gender stuff is all new to me. Getting women at the table is not really a problem. You just need to act like a man. I never had any problems.”

16 Maureen Scully has argued that these “meritocracy stories” are often revisionist in nature, reorganizing events and facts in such a way as to preserve intact the “faith in meritocracy” that is “at the heart of how inequality is reproduced” (Scully, 2002: 400).


18 In the situation described as “current” in WIIS’s Diversity Report, the 43% of the staff classified as “minority” consisted of three student interns. The four paid employees at that time were all classified as “Caucasian.”

19 Between October 2002 and April 2003, I conducted telephone interviews with ten alumnae of the WIIS summer symposiums held in 1999, 2000, and 2001. Participants were identified through word-of-mouth inquiries among the author’s personal and professional networks, and the interview consisted of questions aimed at determining the impact of the symposium on each woman’s career path and the extent of her involvement with the organization. These were the only WIIS members not holding leadership positions with whom I conducted formal, structured interviews. None reported being asked to contribute anything other than dues to WIIS, a situation that several found disappointing. While all of these women reported forming at least one vital friendship during the symposium, they all—with one exception—felt only the vaguest sense of connection with WIIS as an organization. This sample differed in two obvious ways from the participants in the 2003 Summer Symposium, which I attended as an observer. While the women I interviewed were all U.S. nationals, perhaps as much as 50% of the Summer 2003 class were international students; while none of the women I interviewed reported a history of involvement with the NGO community or with women’s international NGOs more specifically, most of the young women I had a chance to speak with at any length during the 2003 symposium did.

20 The Center for Gender in Organization’s Working Across Differences research program has developed a fresh approach and new tools for tackling these mundane yet critical dimensions of organizational life. See, in particular, Holvino and Sheridan, 2003.

21 “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” issued in September 2002, rhetorically positions women as parallel to private property and as deserving of respect (p.3). The document includes no language calling for their inclusion in policy making or implementation (such as that in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325).

22 No women are listed as authors of the Sept. 2000 report Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, the acknowledged precursor to President Bush’s National Security Strategy issued in September 2002. One woman, Devon Gaffney Cross, is listed among the contributors to that report, and one woman, Mary Ellen Bork, serves in a leadership capacity with the report’s sponsor, The Project for a New American Century. Much U.S. defense policy is implemented through contracts with private firms; while data on patterns of women’s employment within these firms is not publicly available, information on their boards, officers, and history often is. Many of the most prominent government defense contractors were founded by retired military officers, who used their experience of on-the-ground combat situations to identify niche products and services which could be
developed and sold to the government (Avant 2002). Because these goods cross all sectors of industry, it is extremely difficult to disaggregate information on defense contracting from the U.S. economy overall, a point explicated by Cynthia Enloe in her book *Maneuvers: the International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives.*

23 For a more extensive version of this chart, please see Ely, R.J. and Meyerson, D.E. (2000).

24 See, for example, the discussion of masquerade as a tactic in historical perspective in Amy Swerdlow’s *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960*, esp. p. 65-72, 108-113. Although all of the major U.S.-based anti-war mobilizations organized over the past year feature paired male/female leaders, and women are clearly at the center of these mainstream citizen’s organizations, several actions and tactics specifically for and by women have also emerged, most notably Code Pink and the Lysistrata Project. The flamboyant and theatrical nature of these political projects raises doubts about the literalness of their organizers’ interpretation of the signifier “woman”. If you are going to dress up as a woman to do your political protest, does it really matter if, underneath the costume, you are biologically female? And what can it mean to be a woman against war when one of the chief architects leading the charge is a woman herself? Rather than assert a sameness among women in their relationship to war, CODE PINK has designed actions aimed specifically at engaging and making publicly visible the conflict between themselves as women citizens advocating peace and women holding positions of leadership within the structures of government. For example, Charlotte Beers, Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for the State Department, was an early target when CODE PINK members disrupted one of her press conferences by unfurling a banner reading “Charlotte, Stop Selling War.”

The organizers of the Lysistrata Project and of CODE PINK do not use the term “woman” to claim common ground on the basis of biology or socialization, but rather as the marker of an “other” way of ordering reality, as a means of claiming a perspective outside the hegemonic. The praxis of women’s peace organizations, then, has embraced a post-structural understanding of gender as de-coupled from biology and as social performance, rather than “sex role” reenactment. Their actions are targeted to “disrupt the social order and revise the structural, interactive, and interpretive practices” through which security and defense policy are made and carried out.

25 On the surface, it appears that Women in Defense (WID) offers a slate of professional development activities and networking opportunities similar to those offered by WIIS, although the speakers featured at WID events and conferences are more likely to be men than women. WID serves the needs of those women committed to reasserting a “national security” agenda driven by military considerations. Like WIIS, WID sets its annual dues low, and dues paid for membership in WID automatically include full membership in the National Defense Industry Association (NDIA). NDIA, which boasts over 24,000 individual members, is a mixed-sex professional association organized as a “business league” under chapter 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue tax code (no women serve as officers or on the executive committee of that organization and only two women sit on its twenty-seven member board of directors). As a “business league,” donations and dues received are only tax deductible to the extent to which these sums are not used for lobbying, although lobbying to “encourage the use of good and services of an entire industry” or to promote more favorable business conditions for an industry are fully allowable activities. In fact, NDIA seems to be organized administratively primarily to push its legislative agenda, of which the top four priority areas for 2003 are 1) funding America’s defense, 2) sustaining the defense industrial base, 3) protecting the defense industrial base, and 4) improving the international competitiveness of the U.S. defense industry. Although WID offers scholarships to young women through its Horizons Foundation, nowhere does WID’s mission statement speak to a need or desire for change in the status quo. Rather, WID supports the agenda of NDIA, which in turn works to promote opportunities for women by ensuring the expansion of the industry as a whole.

26 Such conferences are typically underwritten by specially designated funding and take place at conference facilities, such as the Aspen Institute in Berlin.

27 Many major universities are currently investing heavily in building their capacities in the areas of information technology and institutional communications (“branding”). If WIIS can develop vehicles (for example, an online journal or video streaming of key events) that further its own purposes, while also furthering the goals of its host university, it may be able to tap into institutional resources to subsidize its expansion in this arena.
REFERENCES


